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Yugoslavia and the Two German States

Yugoslavia's Stance towards the German Question during the Late 1940s and Early 1950s: From Bloc Allegiance to Non-Alignment

In the late 1940s the dissolution of the war-time anti-Hitler coalition became obvious, and a bipolar world began to assume its shape. The boundary between the two poles in Europe was at the same time an internal border of Germany. The issue of German division and unification directly correlated to the relations between former war allies with which other countries of eastern and western spheres aligned themselves. Moreover, following the Cominform Resolution of 1948 Yugoslavia, once a strong ally of the USSR, almost overnight became the first 'dissident' of the Eastern Bloc. Consequently, in the end of the following year, in search of new allies, it redirected its foreign policy towards cooperation with the West.

Works dealing with Yugoslav-German relations after World War II almost inevitably emphasise that Yugoslavia followed the Soviet position on the German question until the conflict with the Cominform, and that as early as in 1949 Yugoslav authorities aligned their position on this issue with the official position of West Germany and the West.¹ The confrontation with Moscow was undoubtedly a turning point for Yugoslavia's foreign and internal policy. However, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether it really resulted in aligning Yugoslavia's stance towards the German question with that of West Germany and western countries, or

1 Thomas Brey, „Bonn und Belgrad - Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Jugoslawien seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg“, *Osteuropa*, Vol. 29, No. 8 (1979), 633; Dušan Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija. Tito između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Demokratske Republike Njemačke*, (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2004), 71; Marija Anić de Osona, *Die erste Anerkennung der DDR. Der Bruch der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), 10.

in the creation of a distinctive Yugoslav policy towards this key Cold War issue. Moreover, through the example of Yugoslavia's stance towards the German question, this paper will try to answer the question of whether the Yugoslav-Soviet split was a *Stunde Null* for Yugoslavia's foreign policy or some continuity of Yugoslavia's foreign policy could still be recognised before and after the confrontation. Besides this introductory part, the paper comprises five chapters encompassing the positions of great powers on the German question, two German states' policies on the German question, Yugoslavia's stance towards the German question before the confrontation with the Cominform, shift in the Yugoslav stance in the end of 1940s and concluding remarks.

The German question and great powers

As a question of national identity and unification, culture and cultural area, unsolved border issues and polycentric statehood, the German question was not very much different from other national questions in Europe. However, the attempts of tackling the German question on two occasions in the 20th century caused conflicts of global scale and consequences, which made it an unprecedented question in the European history.² The debris, both physical and moral, in which the world found itself after the end of World War II, "made the German Question everybody's question".³ Germany was the only power of the Axis against which all four war allies – the Soviet Union, the United States, France and the United Kingdom – jointly fought. Despite different political concepts and visions for the post-war Germany, the Allies could agree that Germany must be prevented from once again becoming a threat to world peace. According to Gregor Schöllgen, this was the lowest, if not the only, denominator on which members of the anti-Hitler coalition could agree.⁴ Essentially, for Germans themselves, tackling the German question after World War II meant achieving German unification. For the great powers, German neighbours and other states that fell victim to German aggression in recent past, tackling of the German question was directly related to the issue European security. Hence, the German question became one of the key factors in shaping the

2 Karl Cordell, *Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic since Reunification: The German Question Continued*, (Routledge, 2005), 3.

3 David Schoenbaum, Elisabeth Pond, *The German Question and Other German Questions*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 5.

4 Gregor Schöllgen, *Geschichte der Weltpolitik von Hitler bis Gorbatschow 1941-1991*, (München: Verlag C.H. Beck), 1996, 20.

post-war international order, and Germany itself became, to some extent, the victim of alienation of war allies and their grouping into confronted ideological, political and military blocs.⁵

The foundations for the Germany's post-war order were laid during the war itself. The future of the European continent was the subject of the Atlantic Charter, the Casablanca Conference (January 1943) and the Tehran Conference (November/December 1943), meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow (October 1944), the Yalta Conference (February 1945) and the Potsdam Conference (July/August 1945), as well as meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs within the European Advisory Commission.⁶ Guidelines for overcoming the 'militarism and Nazism' of the common enemy were discussed in detail by the 'Big Three' in February 1945 in Yalta.⁷ On this occasion, they decided that each of the three powers would occupy three separate zones in Germany, and that after the end of the war, France would be offered one. They agreed to disarm and demilitarize Germany, to remove the military equipment, to destroy or take control over the German military industry, to punish war criminals, to ban the Nazi party, abolish the Nazi legislation, organisations and institutions, and to eradicate the Nazi ideology from the public and cultural sphere. In principle, an agreement on reparations was achieved, but the determination of their values was assigned to a special commission. As regards Poland, and indirectly Germany, they agreed that the eastern border would follow the Curzon Line, while the western border of Poland was to be determined at a peace conference.⁸

5 Nicolas Lewkowicz, *The German Question and the International Order, 1943-48*, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2010), 1-8.

6 The European Advisory Commission drafted, among other things, a document on unconditional surrender of Germany, a proposal on borders between the occupation zones in Germany, a proposal on allied occupation administration in Germany, etc. Gregor Schöllgen, *Geschichte der Weltpolitik*, 22-28.

7 William R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin. The Cold War Struggle over Germany*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, 10-17.

8 "Crimea (Yalta) Conference. February 11, 1945. Report on the Crimea Conference", in: *The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in International Relations. Vol. 1. Confrontation and Co-operation*, Günther Doeker, Jens A. Brückner (eds.), Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana Publications, 1979, 13-20.
Fraser J. Harbutt, *Yalta 1945. Europe and America at the Crossroads*, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
„Erklärungen und Vereinbarungen von Jalta (vom 12. Februar 1945)“, in: Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung. Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955*, Bonn: BpB, 1991, 345-347.

Although the war allies agreed that the German aggression in future should be prevented, that it was necessary to establish a provisional (but not short-term) division of Germany and a control over the political, economic and cultural life of the country, that those responsible for crimes should be punished and certain reparations imposed, many controversial issues remained open after the Yalta Conference, such as the issues of division, borders and reparations, that needed to be solved at another 'meeting at the highest level'. The Potsdam Conference, which lasted from 17 July to 1 August 1945, reached an agreement on several important issues, some of which were later subject to various interpretations by occupation powers. The Conference reached an agreement on the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers that would do the preparatory work for the peace settlements with Germany and its war allies. They agreed that Germany should be treated as a single economic unit, that the equitable distribution of commodities in all occupied areas should be ensured and that the German economy should be decartelised, war industry destroyed and support provided to peaceful industries. The decision was made by common accord that there would be no permanent division of Germany. Deportation of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland was approved. As regards the reparations, it was agreed in principle that the reparations were to be taken by the USSR from its zone of occupation, and by the western powers from their own occupation zones.⁹ The issue of the western frontier of Poland, i.e. the eastern frontier of Germany, was also discussed at the Conference, but the wording used in the agreement represented a source of discord and various interpretations in the decades to come.¹⁰

Important decisions related to the administration over the German territories. Besides the local German self-government authorities, the establishment of German authorities at the level of zones was also envis-

9 Moreover, the USSR was to get 15% of the industrial capital from the western zones in exchange for an equivalent value of food products and raw materials, while 10% of the industrial capital from the western zones was to be taken by Moscow without any reimbursements in return.

10 Although emphasised that the German-Polish frontier would officially be solved by a peace agreement, the Potsdam Agreement envisaged that a part of German territory east from the Oder River and the Neisse River was not to be made a part of the Soviet occupation zone, but to be placed under the administration of Poland until the peace agreement was reached. "Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference), Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany (1946) Suppl. No. 1, p. 13 ff., in: *The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in International Relations. Vol. 1. Confrontation and Co-operation*, 40–48.

aged, as well as the establishment of political parties and trade unions. The Allied Control Council was to be a supreme administrative authority in Germany, but zone administrators were conferred with great powers in decision-making and the execution of such decisions, which in practice opened room for an independent policy of occupation authorities.¹¹ Thus Yalta and Potsdam were at the same time the “sources of cooperation and conflict”¹², or in other words the forums at which “the struggle *against* Germany ended and the struggle *over* Germany began”.¹³ According to William R. Smyser, by promoting cooperation, the last summit of the ‘Big Three’ essentially maintained the division between the allies who, by projecting a unified Germany, established a divided country.¹⁴

Frictions, and lack of trust and understanding among the allies shaped the political, economic, cultural and institutional scenery of Germany after 1945. In a way, this made the German question a playground for testing the possibilities of post-war cooperation between the war-time allies. In the 1945-1949 period, ministers of foreign affairs of the four victorious powers discussed the German question on five occasions.¹⁵ The issues that caused frictions during the ministerial meetings and the sittings of the Allied Control Council related, among other things, to the Soviet requests for reparations, the Soviet and French efforts to control the Ruhr area, building up central German administrative authorities, border issues, etc. On the one hand, Soviet policy on the German question was largely shaped by the lack of trust in the western powers and fear that the US and German capital might be united against the USSR. The western powers, on the other hand, did not trust the Soviet proposals for creating a unified, neutral Germany, fearing the Soviet impact on the entire Ger-

11 “Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference), Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany (1946) Suppl. No. 1, p. 13 ff., in: *The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in International Relations. Vol. 1. Confrontation and Co-operation*, 40–48. William R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, 18–26; Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung*, 28–35.

12 Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung*, 28.

13 William R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, 25.

14 William R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, 26.

15 Conferences in Paris 25/4–12/7/1946, in New York 4/11–11/12/1946, in Moscow 10/3–24/4/1947, in London 15/11–15/12/1947, and in Paris 23/5–20/6/1949. In addition, in 1945 there were two meetings of Ministers of foreign affairs, in London and in Moscow, without the presence of the French party. In September 1948, the Ministers of foreign affairs met in Paris, but the topic of their discussions was not the German question, but Italy. Gregor Schöllgen, *Geschichte der Weltpolitik*, 30–31.

man territory.¹⁶ Thus, out of occupation zones that resulted from Germany's war defeat, within four years two German states emerged as a direct consequence of the Cold War.¹⁷ While the issue of German future was a key factor in shaping the post-war international order, the German Cold War destiny was a reflection of the new relations among the powers and their spheres of influence. Stances of other countries towards the German question were frequently regarded as a reflection of their overall position in the bipolar world.¹⁸

The East and West German policies on the German question

Political entities on the territory of the divided Germany had, just like the Allies, different visions for tackling the German question. Their policies were partly shaped by their own and partly by the political and ideological convictions and interests of the occupation powers. However, despite different social, political, economic and cultural systems in East and West Germany, up until the mid-1960s both parties kept the German question open, the issue of the two countries' sovereignty unsettled, maintaining policies focused on achieving German unification.

Claiming the right to being the sole representative of the German people and non-recognition of the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic were, ever since the establishment of two German states in 1949, the pillars of foreign and internal policies of the West German Government. This political course was endorsed by West German allies, and it also enjoyed internal political consensus of all parliamentary parties, except for the Communist Party of Germany. At the international level, the exclusive mandate policy was a regional West German contribution to the US strategy of containment. At the same time, it served the Government in Bonn to maintain, at least symbolically, the image of German unity. Internally, by denouncing the 'totalitarian' system of the GDR and by

16 Wilfried Loth identifies several imperatives of the Soviet policy on Germany during and after World War II - the security issue, i.e. ensuring the prevention of German aggression, imposing reparations as both a contribution to the Soviet economy and a measure against re-strengthening of Germany and fear of American-capitalist Germany pact. Wilfried Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child*, 1-4.

17 Horst Möller, „Zwei deutsche Staaten, eine Nation? Zum nationalen Selbstverständnis in den Verfassungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR“, in: *Das doppelte Deutschland: 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz*, Hrsg. Udo Wengst und Hermann Wentker, (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008)

18 Nicolas Lewkowicz, *The German Question and the International Order, 1943-48*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1-8.

distancing themselves from the 'totalitarian' Nazi past, West German authorities legitimized their claim to represent all Germans, and explained their "moral obligation" towards the German population east of the Elbe River. Non-recognition of the GDR was also significant for the national self-awareness of the Germans as it fitted the narrative on the uninterrupted continuity of Germany, which formed the basis for the historical legitimacy of the West German state and for claiming the right to the representation of a unified Germany within the borders of 1937.¹⁹

Unlike the West German exclusive mandate policy and the consequent diplomatic isolation of the German Democratic Republic, the struggle for the international recognition was at the core of East Germany's foreign policy until the early 1970s. Less than three weeks after the creation of the German Democratic Republic in 1949, its Minister of Foreign Affairs invited all the countries of the world to establish relations with the newly founded state.²⁰ The invitation was accepted only by the Eastern Bloc countries. However, from the very beginning, East Germany's struggle for recognition depended on two external factors - the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. The GDR's struggle for recognition was a response to the western and West Germany's "non-recognition policy", defined and operationally developed immediately after the establishment of East Germany. At the same time, on the international arena, the GDR depended on the Soviet policy on the German question and on the support the USSR was ready to provide for the East German efforts to achieve the international recognition.

Unlike the FRG, the stance of the East Germany's leadership was that the German Reich had been defeated, that there was no continuity with the previous regime, and that both German states had the same right to the German heritage. East Germany's declared political imperative was achieving German unification, but in practice it aimed at internal consolidation and international recognition. Its legitimacy was, on one hand, based on historical determinism. The GDR authorities claimed they were fulfilling a "historic mission" of creating the first workers' state on

19 Heinrich End, *Zweimal deutsche Außenpolitik. Internationale Dimensionen des innerdeutschen Konflikts 1949-1972*, (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1973), 24-26; William Glenn Grey, *Germany's Cold War. The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969*, (The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 10-13; Gregor Schöllgen, *Deutsche Außenpolitik. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart*, (München: C. H. Beck, 2013), 21-58.

20 This refers to Georg Dertinger's statement of 24 October 1949. Carel Horstmeier, *Stiefkind der Staatengemeinschaft*, 65.

German soil. On the other hand, East Germany's legitimacy was based on the Potsdam Agreement and its provisions on demilitarisation, denazification and democratisation, that could be accomplished only by a truly "democratic" socialist regime. In line with this, the East Germans tried to delegitimize the regime in the Federal Republic as imperialistic, undemocratic, Neo-Nazi regime of class enemies, although its political and legal existence was not denied.²¹

Not all political entities on German soil agreed with the official policies on the German question. Among the West German politicians, in particular, different opinions could be heard about the path the post-war Germany should take. Jakob Kaiser, who transferred in 1948 from the Soviet to the western occupation zones, spoke about the role of Germany as a political and cultural "bridge", pointing out that Germans must not choose between East and West, but rather opt for "both East and West".²² Kaiser was not the only one considering the "third path" for Germany, which matched the ideas on the united Europe as the "third power" between the East and the West. However, not only did such concepts become increasingly unfeasible with the sharpening East-West conflict, but they were also not supported by the western allies.²³ Chairman of the Social Democratic Party Kurt Schumacher, a staunch opponent of Nazism but also a hard-core anti-communist, deemed the idea of a unified, neutral Germany between the two blocs impossible to realize due to Moscow's hegemonic policy. His vision for Germany's future was therefore associated with the ideal of a socialist Germany integrated into the anti-Soviet bloc of socialist countries of Central and Western Europe. However, due to the US pressure, declining unity of West European socialist parties, and poor relations Kurt Schumacher had with the occupation powers, the idea of a socialist Europe was not feasible. Although, in principle, the Social Democratic Party was not against western integration and remilitarisation, it

21 Heinrich End, *Zweimal deutsche Außenpolitik*, 28–30.

22 Dominik Geppert, *Die Ära Adenauer*, 2. Auflage, Darmstadt: WBG, 2007, 33; Alexander Gallus, *Die Neutralisten. Verfechter eines vereinten Deutschland zwischen Ost und West 1945-1990*, (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2001), 57–64.

23 For instance, Alfred Andersch and Hans Werner Richter, editors of 'Der Ruf' anti-fascist newspaper in the American occupation zone, were forced out of their editorial roles by the US authorities. They had previously criticised the occupational policy, the Truman doctrine and advocated for a socialist Germany between East and West. The journal soon ceased publication after their ousting. Hermann Glaser, *Kleine deutsche Kulturgeschichte von 1945 bis heute*, Frankfurt am Mein: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007, 52–54; Thorsten Hinz, *Literatur aus der Schuldkolonie. Schreiben in Deutschland nach 1945*, Schnellroda, Edition Antaios, 2010, 21-30.

opposed the manner in which Konrad Adenauer, following the wishes of his western allies, was achieving the proclaimed goal. They described his methods as “conservative, clerical, capitalistic, cartelistic”. Schumacher believed that western powers needed to treat Germany as equal and recognize its right to self-determination, before discussing mutual cooperation and western integration. Moreover, he believed that each distortion from the provisional nature of West Germany would be directly against the goal of German reunification.

Yugoslavia’s policy on the German question until the split with the USSR

As the German question was multi-layered, encompassing not only political, but also economic, cultural and identity dimensions, Yugoslavia’s position on it was also determined by several factors. It stemmed from ideological beliefs of the new Yugoslav authorities, from the recent war experience, as well as from collective and individual memories of World War I, from concrete political, and more importantly, economic interests, as well as from the overall Yugoslav position in the new international order.

Works dealing with Yugoslav-German relations agree that in the first years after the end of World War II, Yugoslavia’s stance on the German question followed the Soviet line. Although during those years Yugoslavia had very little influence in the international arena, it did not mean that the Yugoslav state and party leadership did not have a vision for a desirable future of Germany. Moreover, there were some concrete issues related to Germany in which Yugoslavia was interested, notably the issues of reparation, restitution, repatriation, engagement of German experts, destinies of *volksdeutsche*s and German prisoners in Yugoslavia. These concrete issues were direct points of contact between the Germans and the Yugoslavs in the first post-war years. They shaped, together with ideological beliefs, fears of German “revanchism” and perception that Yugoslav and Soviet interests are mutual, the way in which the Yugoslavs thought the German question could be solved.

The need to prevent Germany from rising again, shared by all allies, was also shared by the Yugoslav leadership. Major foreign policy agreement concluded by the new Yugoslav state, the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-war Cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USSR, was signed in Moscow on 11 April 1945, before the official termination of World War II. Its first articles were binding both par-

ties to fight against Germany until the end of the war, and to provide mutual assistance in case one of them was attacked by Germany after the war ended.²⁴ Therefore, fight against Germany, fear of Germany's re-ascend and aggression and the need to protect its own security interests in case of Germany's threat, were not only the common denominators for all war allies, but also the basis for cooperation between Yugoslavia and the friendly Soviet Union towards the very end of the war.

In Yugoslavia, at the end of World War II, Germans were predominantly perceived as enemies and fascists. Such perception permeated almost all reports and analyses written by the members of the Yugoslav Military Mission in Berlin during the first post-war years. In Yugoslav view, "fascist ideas" and the "spirit of militarism" shaped the German attitude towards the occupation powers, communism and the Soviet Union. The residents of Berlin were perceived as "typical Germans", who were cruel towards their subordinates and servile to their superiors. Their "innate arrogance" was deemed an obstacle to the allies' efforts to conduct denazification.²⁵

The hostile attitude to Germans and the fear of revanchism, combined with direct economic interests of Yugoslavia, resulted in the desire for retaliation, punishment and the need to impose as high reparations as possible. As Yugoslavia did not directly participate in making decisions on reparations, the Yugoslav representatives, in their talks with influential persons, tried to emphasise the situation in Yugoslavia prior to World War I, sufferings experienced by the Yugoslav population during World War II, difficulties of industrialisation, and the fact that Germany, thanks to experts and resources, would soon re-ascend and become stronger. The Yugoslavs were essentially afraid that, for the purpose of gaining support from the German population, (western) allies would concede when it comes to dismantling and reparation requests from Germany. Therefore, the Yugoslavs were following negotiations regarding reparations very closely. They were convinced that the divergent inter-

24 „Ugovor o prijateljstvu, uzajamnoj pomoći i posleratnoj saradnji Jugoslavije i SSSR, Moskva, 11. aprila 1945“, in: Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečević (prir.), *Jugoslavija 1918–1988. Tematska zbirka dokumenata*, drugo, dopunjeno izdanje, (Beograd: Izdavačka radna organizacija "Rad", 1988), 790–791.

25 Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DA MSP RS), Politička arhiva (PA), 1946, f. 65, dos. 8, dok. 2070, „Prvi mesečni izveštaj Savetnika Jugoslovenske Vojne misije u Berlinu Dr Ranka Mikačića Šefu Vojne misije Jaki Avšiću uz molbu da prosledi Načelniku Političkog odeljenja MIP-a Jože Brileju, 5. februara 1946.“

ests of occupation powers were the key factors hindering the agreement on the reparation issue. In Yugoslav view, the Soviet Union 'most strictly' abided by the Potsdam Agreement on allowing Germany to keep only what was necessary to meet its needs.²⁶ Yugoslavia's representatives believed that the British and the U.S. occupation powers were "pampering" the German population, and that it was in their interest not to have Germany weakened too much.²⁷

Although aware that the Soviet policy on reparations and Germany's eastern border did not add to the popularity of the Communist Party of Germany and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany,²⁸ they hoped that the agitation efforts of Soviet occupation authorities could "eradicate the speculating spirit of the Germans"²⁹, believing that it was necessary to fight more actively against Nazi war criminals, using the "bottom-up" approach and antagonising the populace and wealthier 'Nazis', "thus causing the class awareness of the proletariat".³⁰ Therefore, compliance with the Potsdam Agreement provisions, which the Yugoslav leadership advocated with regard to the German question, actually meant the need for decartelisation, demilitarisation and denazification of Germany, which besides the 'eradication' of Nazism also entailed meeting the economic needs of the war-damaged countries, including Yugoslavia, encompassing this way the ideological convictions, economic needs and the desire for retaliation.

The fear of German militarism, of the US and UK pretensions in Germany and the need for reparations were calmed in the first post-war years by the trust in the solidness of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. In the summer of 1946, Yugoslav diplomats were writing from Berlin that it was "of the utmost importance for our country to keep this [Soviet, au-

26 DA MSP RS, PA, 1946, f. 65, dos. 7, dok. 2825, "Mesečni izveštaj Šefa jugoslovenske Vojne misije general-lajtnanta J. Avšiča, 11. 2. 1946."

27 DA MSP RS, PA, 1946, f. 65, dos. 8, dok. 2070, „Prvi mesečni izveštaj Savetnika Jugoslovenske Vojne misije u Berlinu Dr Ranka Mikačiča Šefu Vojne misije Jaki Avšiču uz molbu da prosledi Načelniku Političkog odeljenja MIP-a Jože Brileju, 5. februara 1946.“

28 DA MSP RS, PA, 1946, f. 64, dos. 1, dok. 15028, „Šef Vojne misije general-lajtnant Jaka Avšič, Ministarstvu inosranih poslova FNRJ, izveštaj o rezultatima berlinskog glasanja“, 9. decembra 1946.

29 DA MSP RS, PA, 1946, f. 65, dos. 7, dok. 2825, "Mesečni izveštaj Šefa jugoslovenske Vojne misije general-lajtnanta J. Avšiča, 11. 2. 1946."

30 DA MSP RS, PA, 1946, f. 64, dos. 1, dok. 15028, „Šef Vojne misije general-lajtnant Jaka Avšič, Ministarstvu inosranih poslova FNRJ, izveštaj o rezultatima berlinskog glasanja“, 9. decembra 1946.

thor's comment] resolute stance. First of all, Germany must not be allowed to reemerge as an aggressor, which would threaten the security of our country."³¹ They thought that the issue of German unification could not be separated from the issues of demilitarisation and denazification, and that if Germany was to develop "progressively", it "would not be dangerous for other nations either".³² Therefore, whenever it had an opportunity to express its positions in the international arena, Yugoslavia supported Soviet stances. At the Pre-Conference of representatives of Foreign Affairs Ministers in London on the German question, in the beginning of 1947, Yugoslavia underlined the necessity for a long-term allied occupation and control over Germany, the need for common allied policies, preservation of German unity based on the Potsdam Agreement, and the necessity for tackling the issue of reparations.

A year later, on the eve of the conference of western powers in London³³, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland met on 17-18 February 1948 in Prague. The main topic of this meeting was the German question, and its outcome was a declaration presented in the form of a note to the governments of the four big powers, the Allied Control Council in Berlin and to the governments of those European countries that suffered in the war against Germany.³⁴ The Note of the three countries expressed direct support to the Soviet policy on the German question. It emphasised their concern that Germany was developing in the direction contrary to the principles endorsed in Yalta and Potsdam on the creation of a unified, democratic, denazified and demilitarised Germany that would pay damages to the affected nations through reparations, and use its industrial potential for the benefit of the community of democratic nations. It underlined that the western allies had "evaded obligations" for three years, "creating some Bi-zones and Tri-zones, partitioning Germany even further, probably for the purpose of breaking it into pieces and reducing to nil both war accountabilities and accountabil-

31 DA MSP RS, PA, 1946, f. 65, dos. 8, dok. 9342, „Mesečni izveštaj Vojne misije FNRJ u Berlinu za juni“, 15 juli 1946.

32 Ibid.

33 After the failure of the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four powers held in London in November/December 1948, representatives of the United Kingdom, the USA, France and the Benelux countries met in London in the end of February. This conference established foundations for the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

34 Слободан Селинић, *Југословенско-чехословачки односи 1945-1955*, (Београд: ИНИС, 2010), 375-377.

ity for reparations”, which led to revitalisation of “fascist” and “revanchistic” ideas in Germany. The Note criticized the fact that the German question was discussed “on conferences of only certain groups of countries, bypassing eastern allies that had made the greatest contribution and the supreme sacrifice in the war”, indicating the possibility of taking two paths - either compliance with the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, or abandoning these principles which would lead to “new *Anschlusses* and *Munichs*”.³⁵

The future of Germany was an issue in which the Yugoslav leadership was genuinely interested. The fear of German militarism and revanchism were not just abstract and inexperienced platitudes, nor was the diplomatic support to the Soviet foreign policy only a passive submittal to the dictate of a more powerful ally. The Yugoslav leadership truly saw the USSR as the only guarantor of Germany’s “progressive” future, i.e. as the only power “that can grapple with this”.³⁶

Creation of Yugoslavia’s policy on the German question

In the eyes of the Yugoslavs, the Soviet Union ceased being a guarantor of the ‘progressive’ future of Germany and the guarantor for resolving the German question in the interest of ‘peace’ and ‘security’ the moment when, following the Cominform Resolution, it became a security threat to the Yugoslav regime. Contours of Yugoslavia’s stance on the German question, and on the two German states, were outlined by Edvard Kardelj in his policy statement before the National Assembly on 27 December 1949. Some have interpreted this Kardelj’s speech as a turning point in Yugoslavia’s stance on the German question, and his words that it was “impossible to indefinitely keep such a large European nation in the condition of occupation and division”³⁷ as a proof that as early as in 1949 Yugoslavia came very close to West Germany’s stance on the German question.³⁸ Arguments supporting the fact that Yugoslavia’s stance on

35 DA MSP RS, PA, 1948, f. 113, dos. 9, dok. 45650, "Izjava Ministra inostranih poslova St. Simića", 20. 2. 1948.

36 DA MSP RS, PA, 1946, f. 65, dos. 8, dok. 9342, "Mesečni izveštaj Vojne misije FNRJ u Berlinu za juni", 15 juli 1946.

37 Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III, Borba protiv sovjetske hegemonije i naša spoljna politika*, (Beograd: Kultura, 1954), 85.

38 Thomas Brey, „Bonn und Belgrad - Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Jugoslawien seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg“, *Osteuropa*, Vol. 29, No. 8 (1979), 633; Dušan Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija. Tito između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Demokratske Republike Njemačke*, (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2004), 71; Marija Anić de Osona, *Die erste Anerkennung der DDR. Der Bruch der*

the German question was the same as the stance of West Germany were being found in Kardelj's words that Germany should unify based on free elections in "both zones", and that it should be independent, equal with other states, which would entail its right to armament for the needs of defending its own independence. However, although the existing literature connects these Kardelj's words with his policy statement 1949, it was a stance expressed three years later, in the speech held at the Sixth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1952.³⁹

Although in 1949 Yugoslavia distanced itself from the Soviet Union on many political issues, including the policy on the German question, considerable differences between Belgrade's and Bonn's stances still persisted. Whereas at the core of West German stance laid the exclusive mandate policy, in his policy statement of December 1949 Kardelj unequivocally pointed out that either East nor West Germany were independent, but occupied states, so accordingly, Yugoslavia would not establish any formal diplomatic relations with neither of the states, until the abolition of the occupation regime.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, due to the fact that German people were a significant political and economic factor in Europe, Kardelj underlined that the lack of formal recognition should not hinder the cooperation in the fields of mutual interest. To prove this point, he evoked the recently concluded trade negotiations in Bonn, adding that Yugoslavia could not be blamed for the lack of any kind of economic cooperation with East Germany.⁴¹

In other words, Yugoslavia's stance towards the German question at the end of 1949 was by no means in line with the Bonn's policy. The Yugoslavs did not privilege one German state over another, considering

deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), 10.

39 It was a stance that Kardelj expressed in his speech at the VI Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on 4 November 1952. Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 281. The literature, however, wrongly connects this stance with Kardelj's speech in December 1949, although the pages authors refer to indicate that it was expressed in the speech he gave in 1952. Thomas Brey, „Bonn und Belgrad - Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Jugoslawien seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg“, *Osteuropa*, Vol. 29, No. 8 (1979), 633-634; Dušan Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija*, 71, 182 (footnote 69).

40 Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 85. In the same speech, when talking about the relations with the USA, Kardelj mentioned that the Yugoslav aviation had been approved landing for commercial flights in the "two airports of the occupied Germany". Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 79.

41 Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 86.

them both as occupied territories and formally keeping some kind of equidistance from both of them. Trade negotiations, which were conducted in December 1949 with representatives of the West German Government, signified the continuation of cooperation in this field, which had previously existed with the western occupation authorities, not an expression of Yugoslav-West German closeness.⁴² Similarly, Yugoslavia's decision to officially end the war with Germany in August 1951, which has been interpreted as a consequence of "good relations" with West Germany, was according to Kardelj the termination of war with Germany "as a whole".⁴³

To understand Yugoslavia's policy on the German question, its foreign policy should be taken into account as a whole. Yugoslavia's stance on the German question should be compared with its stances on other relevant international issues of the time, especially the Korean question. Until the Yugoslav-Soviet split, Yugoslavia followed the Soviet policy regarding the situation in Korea. In 1949, however, at an *ad hoc* UNO Committee meeting, Yugoslav representatives advocated against interfering with the internal issues of the Korean people.⁴⁴ Such a stance stemmed directly from the Yugoslav efforts to defend, on the example of Korea, the principle pivotal for its own international position. After the Korean war broke out in 1950, Yugoslav representatives in the UNO proposed the solution to the Korean conflict that entailed the termination of hostilities, establishment of a temporary administrative border on the 38th parallel, and general democratic elections. As a result, a joint political representation would emerge, that would select a single government, after which all foreign forces would withdraw from Korean soil. This proposal, contrary to both the American stance, and that of the USSR and China, stemmed from the conviction that the Korean people, just like all other peoples, had the right to unification, self-determination and independence, and that the cause of the Korean conflict laid in the interference of great powers. Indirectly, through its stance on the Korean issue, Yugoslavia tried to defend its own international position and the principles that would guarantee its independence with regard to great powers.⁴⁵

42 More info on the 1949 trade negotiations can be found in: Natalija Dimić, "Connecting Trade and Politics: Negotiations on the Release of the German Prisoners of War in Yugoslavia and the First West German-Yugoslav Trade Agreement of 1949/1950", *Istorija 20. veka* 2/2021, 333-352.

43 Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje*, Knjiga III, 256-257.

44 Jadranka Jovanović, *Jugoslavija u Organizaciji ujedinjenih nacija (1945-1953)*, 126.

45 Jadranka Jovanović, *Jugoslavija u Organizaciji ujedinjenih nacija (1945-1953)*, Beograd: ISI, 1985, 126-135; Aleksandar Životić, "Insistiranje na principima?"

These principles, shaped in the late 1940s and early 1950s, entailed opposition to every aggressive war and interference with internal issues of other countries, fostering good neighbourly relations, cultural, economic and political cooperation with other nations based on equality, economic assistance to underdeveloped parts of the world, agreement between great powers, the right of every nation to self-determination and to independent foreign and internal policy, and the cooperation with everyone regardless of the differences in the internal social and political order.⁴⁶ In the context of the overall foreign policy of Yugoslavia, advocating the solution to the German question that was based on the principle of free democratic elections, respect for independence and equality of the German people, including even the right to armament, was in line with the principles of Yugoslav foreign policy that were being shaped at the moment and that served for defending its own independence.⁴⁷

However, unlike the Korean issue, the German question was of vital interest to the Yugoslavs, due to the fact which Kardelj underlined, namely, that Yugoslavia had fell victim to German aggression two times in the recent past.⁴⁸ At the Sixth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1952, both Tito and Kardelj touched upon the German question in the discussions. Germany was seen as a potential powder keg which could ignite a future war in Europe. According to Tito, the situation was volatile not only because of confrontations between great powers but also because of internal dissent in Germany. He compared the current state of Germany with the post-WWI developments. Therefore, Tito saw the solution to the German question in the unification of the German people who would choose their own internal order, adding, however, that Yugoslavia

Jugoslavija i počeci rata u Koreji (1950–1951)“, *Annales. Ser. hist. sociol.*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2014), 594-600; Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 124-146, 193-198.

46 Edvard Kardelj underlined these principles in the National Assembly of the FPRY on 29 December 1950. Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 191-192.

47 The FPRY's stance on the German question was not shaped only by fitting the German issue into the mould of the Yugoslavia's foreign affairs principles. Besides the regular political reports of the Yugoslavia's representatives on the area of FRG, in summer 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Yugoslav representation offices in Bonn, Vienna, Paris, London and Moscow to send thorough reports on the policy of their countries of location on the German question. See: DA MSP RS, PA, 1952, f. 60, dok. 411012, dok. 417455.

48 Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 280.

wanted Germany “to become one of the main pillars of peace and peaceful cooperation through its internal democratic order”.⁴⁹ On this occasion, Kardelj also underlined that the only way to prevent the “awakening” of the German military spirit was to strengthen “internal democratic forces”, which could be enhanced only if Germans were provided with equality. Kardelj feared that an unequal treatment would result in strengthening “Nazi, military and generally extremely reactionary elements” among the Germans, which would give an excuse to the Soviets to further arm East Germany - Yugoslavia’s fierce opponents at the time.⁵⁰

The question now is what “internal democratic forces” in Germany Kardelj had in mind? Before the confrontation with Moscow, “internal democratic forces” were seen among members of communist parties. However, at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, simultaneously with the shift towards the cooperation with western countries, new allies were searched for at the level of parties as well. At first, they were recognised among dissidents and outcasts of communist parties that could easily be identified with the Yugoslav communists as renegades of the Eastern Bloc. At the beginning of the 1950s, however, the “democratic elements” were increasingly found among socialist and social-democratic parties of the West that gathered much more “working masses” than the communist parties.⁵¹

In the same speech at the Sixth Congress, referring to the question of the German armament within the European Defence Community, Kardelj pointed out that it was “understandable” that “some democratic circles” in Germany were not satisfied with such an offer, that they were requesting “equality” and an independent German army.⁵² The key “force” in Germany, fighting at the time eagerly against the EDC in Bundestag and

49 *Борба комуниста Југославије за социјалистичку демократију. VI конгрес КПЈ (Савеза комуниста Југославије)*, (Београд: Култура, 1952), 18.

50 Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 280; *Борба комуниста Југославије за социјалистичку демократију. VI конгрес КПЈ (Савеза комуниста Југославије)*, 168.

51 Александар В. Милетић, *Преломна времена: Милован Ђилас и западноевропска социјалистичка и социјалдемократска левица 1950–1954*, (Београд: ИНИС, 2019); Natalija Dimić, „In Search of an Authentic Position: the First Phase of Political and Ideological Cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West European Left, 1948–1953“, *Acta Histriae*, Vol. 27, 1/2019, 55–74.

52 Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje, Knjiga III*, 279; *Борба комуниста Југославије за социјалистичку демократију. VI конгрес КПЈ (Савеза комуниста Југославије)*, 167.

requesting equal treatment of Germany by the western allies, was the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

The hope that the “democratic forces” in Germany would strengthen, indicates that Yugoslavia’s stance on the German question kept the ideological dimension, even when the realpolitik prevailed. Relations with representatives of the SPD in 1952 were on the rise. At the beginning of the year, Vladimir Dedijer visited Germany where he had a meeting with, among others, Erich Ollenhauer, the second highest-ranked person in the SPD. According to Dedijer, Ollenhauer’s position that Germany and Yugoslavia shared the need to remain independent from both the US and the USSR was of particular importance.⁵³ The conversation between Yugoslav Ambassador to West Germany Mladen Iveković and the leader of the Social Democrats Kurt Schumacher in June 1952 went in the similar direction. Iveković underlined that it was in the interest of Yugoslavia that Germany became an autonomous and an independent state, and that, in his opinion, the SPD was “the only force fighting for the democratic Germany and its independence”.⁵⁴ Although in 1951 and 1952 in particular, a latent fear existed that the SPD’s stance could benefit Moscow, or that the SPD would even be prepared to make an agreement with the Soviets,⁵⁵ the German Social Democratic Party still remained the only political option that could, in Yugoslav view, ensure an independent position for the unified Germany from both the East and the West, and internally, guarantee its development in the “progressive” and “democratic” direction. However, neither the developments on the international arena, nor the election results in West Germany opened up, until late 1960s, a possibility for the SPD to have a decisive influence on Germany’s destiny.

Conclusion

Yugoslavia’s stance towards the German question after World War II was shaped by ideology, individual and collective memories and experiences from World War I and World War II, desire for revenge, and

53 AJ 507/IX, 85/II – 1 – 112, Izveštaj Vladimira Dedijera o kontaktima sa socijalistima februar-mart 1952, 15.3.1952.

54 AJ 507/IX, 85/II – 1 – 112, Zabilješka o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa prvakom SPD Kurtom Šumaherom, 26.6.1952.

55 DA MSP RS, PA, 1951, f. 61, dos. 15, dok. 413462, Pitanje suverenosti i ravnopravnosti, naoružanja i jedinstva Zapadne Nemačke, 7.11.1951.

Yugoslavia's position in the emerging bipolar world. Until the confrontation with the Cominform, Yugoslavia followed the Soviet line. Yugoslav leadership shared the opinion of the Allies that Germany should be prevented from representing a threat again to world peace, but their ideological convictions defined the manner in which they believed this goal could be achieved. In this regard, they believed that Germany could become a genuinely "democratic", "peaceful" and "progressive" state only by changing the ideological mindset of the German population. The "internal force" leading Germany towards a "democratic" future were believed to be the German communists, and the external guarantor the Soviet Union.

The confrontation between Yugoslavia and the Cominform changed Yugoslavia's stance on the German question. Isolated by the East and drawing closer to the West, after the emergence of the two German states, Yugoslavia established bilateral relations only with West Germany. However, this did not include an ideological identification of Yugoslav communists with representatives of western and West German authorities, nor the endorsement of West German view on the German question. As of 1949, the Yugoslav leadership gradually shaped its own policy on the German question. At international forums and public appearances, they advocated German right to unification, self-determination, non-interference of great powers in the internal affairs of the German people, the right to equal treatment and armament for the purpose of defending their sovereignty. By advocating these principles, the Yugoslav leadership essentially defended its own position in the Cold War, its own independence and sovereignty. Yugoslav representatives were careful when talking about the existence of two German states, keeping thus the question of German unification open. The split with the Soviet Union did not mean the disappearance of an ideologically shaped vision of the desirable German future. The Yugoslav leadership still believed that a genuinely "peaceful" Germany must be "progressive" and "democratic", but that the guarantors of its "democratic" nature were no longer the German communists and the Soviet Union. In the early 1950s, the "internal democratic forces" were increasingly recognised among German social democrats.

Yugoslavia and the German Question at the Conferences of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade (1961) and Cairo (1964)

The third day of the Belgrade Conference (1–6 September 1961) began with the speech of the Yugoslav President. Referring to the German question, Tito underlined the reality of two German states and inviolability of the Oder - Neisse border. He stressed more strongly than ever before the difference between East and West Germany. Over the past sixteen years, East Germany moved towards socialism, with “more pronounced new social character”, while West Germany was being “reconstructed”, “with typical capitalist social system, fraught with intertwined remains of fascism and revanchist views and tendencies which are very worrisome”. The only way the German question could be permanently solved Tito saw in the process of “democratisation”, not “militarisation” of Germany. He criticised “short-sightedness” of those powers, unambiguously alluding to the West, which believed that the armed Germany was the guarantor of the European security. He stated that “more powerful armament of West Germany will only make stronger those reactionary and fascist powers that survived Hitler’s war machine.” Concerning the acute crisis around Berlin, Tito was convinced that anyone who would start the war over Berlin “would have a peaceable public from across the world against them!” The only way to overcome the crisis was through negotiations.⁵⁶

Tito’s address at the Belgrade Conference was considered by many at the time as “non-alignment with a strong pro-Soviet tilt”,⁵⁷ and historians have interpreted his stance on the German question in a similar way. It was perceived not only as “a strongly pro-Soviet line”⁵⁸ and an echo of

56 „Говор Председника Тита у Генералној Дебати“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција нестврстаних земаља 1–6. септембра 1961*, (Београд: Завод за уџбенике и наставна средства, 2013), 447–448.

57 Jovan Čavoški, „Between Great Powers and Third World Neutrals: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, 1961“, in: Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Nada Boškovića (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade*, New York/London: Routledge, 2014, 198.

58 William Glenn Grey, *Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 127.

Soviet positions⁵⁹, but also as a way of improving relations with the Soviet Union.⁶⁰

By the summer of 1955, the Soviet leadership had changed its policy on the German question. It adopted a stance that the existence of two German states was a fact, that the reunification could happen through the recognition of the status quo and direct contacts and negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin, and that the Polish-German border established in 1945 was inviolable. The West on the other hand supported the efforts of West Germany to participate in the international arena as a sole representative of the German people within the borders of 1937, while denying any international and legal legitimacy of East Germany. The position Tito held in 1961 on the questions of Germany and Berlin almost coincided with the policy of the East. However, this paper will try to re-examine the assertions prevalent in the historiographical literature explaining Tito's position on the German question at the Belgrade Conference merely as a reaction to the warming up of relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it will try to answer the question of whether the Yugoslav stance on this international matter was identical to the Soviet line. Finally, the goal of this paper is to determine the importance of the non-aligned summits in the context of Yugoslavia's active efforts to influence the resolution of the German question. To that end, the evolution of Yugoslavia's policy on the German question during the 1950s and particularly during the second Berlin crisis will be outlined. Special attention will be paid to the growing importance of non-European states in this context for both the two German states and for Yugoslavia, as well as for Yugoslavia's policy on the questions of Germany and Berlin on the eve of and during the conferences in Belgrade (1961) and Cairo (1964).

Yugoslavia and the German question during the 1950s

Yugoslavia followed the Soviet line on the German question until the Yugoslav-Soviet split of 1948. From that point on, Yugoslavia's lead-

59 Robert B. Rakove, "Apprehension, Engagement, and Withdrawal: The U. S. Approach to Cold War Non-Alignment", in: Duško Dimitrijević, Jovan Čavoški (eds.), *The 60th Anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement*, (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2021), 117.

60 Friederike Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung: Die Jugoslawienpolitik der DDR 1946 bis 1968*, (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), 183; Marc Christian Theurer, *Bonn – Belgrad – Ost-Berlin: Die Beziehungen der beiden deutschen Staaten zu Jugoslawien im Vergleich 1957 – 1968*, (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2008), 125.

ership gradually started formulating its own policy. To a considerable extent, Yugoslavia's stances on the German question reflected its position in a bipolar world. And thus, at the beginning of 1950s, the Yugoslav representatives at international fora advocated the right of the German people to reunification, self-determination, non-interference of the great powers in their internal affairs, equal treatment, and the right to armament for the purpose of defence of sovereignty, thereby defending the same principles underpinning Yugoslavia's own independence and sovereignty in the Cold War. Despite the fact that Yugoslavia maintained economic (since 1949) and diplomatic relations (since 1951) only with the Government in Bonn, it did not adopt the West German policy. Yugoslavia's policy on the German question was influenced by not only the Cold War divisions but also by ideological convictions of the Yugoslav communists, individual and collective memories and experiences from World War I and particularly from World War II. Fears of a strong Germany and desire for retaliation outlived the Yugoslav-Soviet split. The Yugoslavs strongly believed that "peaceable", "progressive" and "democratic" character of Germany was essential for both European and global security.⁶¹

By the mid-1950s, Yugoslavia's policy slowly started to change. In April 1955, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs concluded that non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic was unsustainable, and that "today it is a fact that there are two Germanys".⁶² It was a first step towards diplomatic recognition of the GDR by Belgrade, which would occur two and a half years later. Several different factors influenced Yugoslavia's leadership to take this stance. One of the factors were the improving relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern Bloc, which started after Stalin's death. During this period, Moscow was gradually perceived less and less as a security threat and the policy of equidistance from the two power blocks started to take shape.⁶³ At the same time, the upsurge in West German economic strength provoked fears of

61 More details can be found in the paper published in this collection: *Yugoslavia's Stance towards the German Question during the Late 1940s and Early 1950s: From Bloc Allegiance to Non-Alignment*.

62 DA MSP RS, PA, 1955, f. 51, dok. 45455, Zabeleška o pitanju naših odnosa sa Demokratskom Republikom nemačkom (Istočna Nemačka) i o našem Pretstavništvu u Berlinu, 16. april 1955.

63 Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952–1955*, (Beograd: Službeni list, 2000), 167–178.

“German danger” and “German expansionism”⁶⁴. Furthermore, East Berlin initiated contacts through the representatives of the two countries in Budapest.⁶⁵ During the spring of 1955, Yugoslav diplomacy was preparing itself for the visit of a West German parliamentary delegation, but also for a far more significant one, the visit of the Soviet leadership. Both upcoming meetings definitely affected the need to reconsider and specify Yugoslavia’s stance towards the German question. The signing of the Paris Agreements in the autumn of 1954, according to which West Germany was to become a member of NATO, undoubtedly influenced Yugoslavia’s conviction that the unification of Germany would not be easily achievable in the near future.

Yugoslavia’s pursuing of closer bonds with countries outside of Europe was crowned by Tito’s trip to India and Burma in the winter of 1954-1955,⁶⁶ during which the German question was also discussed.⁶⁷ The Yugoslav President learned that Yugoslavia lagged behind many non-European countries regarding relations with East Germany.⁶⁸ This experience

64 DAMSP RS, PA, 1954, f. 61, dok. 44857, Pitanje naših odnosa sa Saveznom Republikom Nemačkom, 30. mart 1954.

65 Michael Lemke, „Jugoslawien und Rumänien im Konzept der völkerrechtlichen Anerkennung der DDR 1949 bis 1967“, in: Heiner Timmermann (Hrsg.), *Die DDR in Deutschland: Ein Rückblick auf 50 Jahre*, (Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 71. On the steps of East Germany towards establishing relations with Yugoslavia, see: Dušan Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija: Tito između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Demokratske Republike Njemačke*, (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2004), 89-97.

66 On Tito’s trip to India and Burma, see: Dragan Bogetić, „Titovo putovanje u Indiju i Burmu 1954-1955. i oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike nesvrstanosti“, *Istorija 20. veka* 2/2001, 65-73; Ljubodrag Dimić, „Titovo putovanje u Indiju i Burmu 1954-1955: prilog za istoriju hladnog rata“, *Tokovi istorije* 3-4/2004, 27-54.

67 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Kabinet Predsednika Republike (837), I-2/4-1, Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Predsednika sa predsednikom indijske Vlade Nehruom 18. 12. 1954. u Nju Delhiju u 12č; AJ, 837, I-2/4-2, Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika FNRJ Josipa Broza Tita sa predsednikom burmanske Vlade U Nu-om, Brod „Mindon“, 12. 1. 1955.

68 In 1953, German Democratic Republic concluded trade agreements with Egypt and Lebanon, in 1954 with India and Indonesia and in 1955 with Burma and Sudan. See: Hans-Joachim Spanger, Lothar Brock, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt. Die Entwicklungspolitik der DDR – eine Herausforderung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland?*, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), 161; Alexander Troche, *Ulbricht und die Dritte Welt: Ost-Berlins „Kampf“ gegen die Bonner „Alleinvertretungsmaßnahme“*, (Erlangen und Jena: Palm&Enke, 1996), 33-35; Amit Das Gupta, *Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin. Die deutsche Südasienspolitik unter Adenauer und Erhard 1949-1966*, (Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2004), 112-114; Amit Das Gupta, “Ulbricht am Nil”, in: Udo Wengst, Hermann Wentker (Hrsg.), *Das doppelte Deutschland: 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz*, (Bonn: BpB, 2008), 118.

influenced the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs to conclude in April 1955 that the example of other non-bloc countries' relations with the GDR should be followed.⁶⁹ Thus, in the spring of 1955 at the latest, Yugoslavia was prepared to establish economic and cultural contacts with the East German state, and thereby *de facto* recognize its existence. In May 1955, Tito shared his thoughts on Germany with Nikita Khrushchev: "I think it would be wrong to presume and expect that with this unification, even if performed gradually, the Soviet Union and the East German leaders could renounce their individuality and simply blend in with West Germany and accept the order of West Germany."⁷⁰ Thus, the attitude emerged in Yugoslavia not only that the existence of two German states was a reality needed to be accepted, but also that the path to German unification led through negotiations between representatives of the two German states, and potentially even through some form of (con)federation. Not only did it set a milestone for resolving a question of German unification, but also broader issues of European security and cooperation. It was an example of peaceful coexistence and a way to prevent the growth of German militarism. This stance will in practice lead to the diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic in October 1957, which resulted in the severance of relations with Bonn, making Yugoslavia "the first victim of the Hallstein Doctrine".⁷¹

Berlin crisis and Yugoslavia's policy on the German question

A new international crisis over Berlin began in November 1958, with the so-called Khrushchev's first ultimatum. The Soviet leader threatened to sign a separate peace agreement with East Germany unless the western powers withdraw their troops from Berlin. It reopened not only

69 DA MSP RS, PA, 1955, f. 51, dok. 45455, Zabeleška o pitanju naših odnosa sa Demokratskom Republikom Nemačkom (Istočna Nemačka) i o našem Pretstavništvu u Berlinu, 16. april 1955.

70 „Док. бр. 3, Стенографске белешке о разговорима југословенске и совјетске делегације за време посете Н. С. Хрушчова Југославији 26. маја до 3. јуна 1955“, у: *Југославија-СССР. Сусрети и разговори на највишем нивоу руководиоца Југославије и СССР 1946-1964*, 70-71.

71 On the recognition of the German Democratic Republic and the severance of relations with the Federal Republic of Germany see: Maria Anić de Osona, *Die erste Anerkennung der DDR: Der Bruch der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen 1957*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990); Dušan Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija*.

the Berlin question but the German question as well.⁷² Yugoslav diplomacy was cautious, but it actually saw this as an opportunity to take an active part in resolving these vital issues.⁷³

Although the so-called second ideological conflict with Moscow was in full swing, and despite being aware of numerous problems stemming from the Khrushchev's ultimatum, the Yugoslav side considered it a step in the right direction. The Soviet Union and East Germany claimed that Tito's visit to Asia and Africa "was organised to undermine the Soviet influence in these countries",⁷⁴ impede the development of good relations between non-European and socialist countries,⁷⁵ and that Yugoslavia's foreign policy was "in the service of imperialism"⁷⁶. Nevertheless, Tito demonstrated unambiguous sympathies for Khrushchev's proposal, by actively supporting the Soviet (and East German) initiatives during the visit to Asia and Africa.⁷⁷

During the talks he conducted in the Far East, Tito stressed that raising the Berlin question was not dangerous per se, that it would not lead to global conflict, and in fact that the "skilful policy" of the USSR placed the West before a fait accompli. In his opinion, the Soviets were trying to force Bonn and the West to stop ignoring the GDR.⁷⁸ During the talks in Burma, Tito clearly expressed his solution to the German question: in the first phase, the "individuality" of the German Democratic Republic should be recognized; then the two German states should establish economic relations; and then state unity in some form of a (con)federation would fol-

72 Aleksandr Fursenko, Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary*, (New York/London: Norton&Company, 2007), 199–209.

73 DA MSP RS, PA, 1959, f. 116, dos. 24, dok. 42573, Sovjetski predlozi o Berlinu i mirovnom ugovoru sa Nemačkom, 29. 1. 1959.

74 AJ, 837, I-5-b/99-7, Izvod iz zabeleške o razgovoru savetnika naše Ambasade u Moskvi Tabora sa Deduškinom, načelnikom odeljenja u MID-u SSSR-a, 25. 11. 1958.

75 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA), MfAA, A 5068, Einschätzung über die Reise Titos nach den afro-asiatischen Ländern

76 Đoko Tripković, *Jugoslavija–SSSR 1956–1971*, (Beograd: ISI, 2013), 97–98.

77 Tito spent three months abroad, from December 5, 1958 until March 5, 1959. During that time, he visited Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan, Greece and twice the United Arab Republic, at the beginning and at the end of his journey.

78 AJ, 837, I-2/11-2, Zabeleška o jugoslovensko-indonežanskim razgovorima u toku posete Predsednika Indoneziji od 23. 12. 1958. do 1. 1. 1959; AJ, 837, I-2/11-3, Zabeleška o razgovoru Pretsednika Republike sa deset članova IK Burmanske socijalističke partije na čelu sa Ba Šveom i U Čo Njenom, 9. 1. 1959; AJ, 837, I-2/11-4, Zabeleške o razgovorima druga Pretsednika sa Pretsednikom indijske vlade Dž. Nehruom, 13-19. 1. 1959.

low, within which the existing socio-political systems would be preserved, socialist system in the East and the capitalist one in the West.⁷⁹

The real reason which led the Yugoslav leadership to reject the option of resolving the German question through free elections was presented to Nehru during the talks in January 1959. When discussing unification through (con)federation, Tito underlined: "This is the only thing which could prevent all the Germans from taking one direction, and that is the one towards militarism, and it would create more opportunities for the democratic development of Germany". Veljko Mićunović further added: "This would also weaken the idea of revanchism".⁸⁰

While Tito was exchanging views with the leaders of Asia and Africa, Yugoslav diplomacy was preparing a response to the Soviet note - an invitation to a conference aimed at signing of a peace treaty with Germany. In its response, the Yugoslav government reiterated its well-known stances on the German question. As a country whose peoples have twice been victims of German aggression, it expressed the interest and readiness to participate in a conference devoted to signing of a peace treaty with Germany.⁸¹ "Yugoslavia has an indisputable right to participate in resolving the German question," Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović said shortly before the Geneva Conference in May 1959.⁸² However, at the time, Yugoslavia's opinion was not welcome in either the East or the West, and Yugoslavia's desire to have its voice heard and respected on this important international issue remained unfulfilled. The Geneva Conference did not result in a solution, nor did the meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower held in Paris the following year. In addition, the "blow" to the Yugoslav conceptions came also from the West German Social Democrats. Their policy on the German question, expressed in the *Plan for Germany* from early 1959, was seen by the Yugoslav side as "essentially anti-bloc" policy.⁸³ However, the foreign policy turn of the SPD in 1960 meant that Belgrade lost a German ally in resolving the German

79 AJ, 837, I-2/11-3, Zabeleška o razgovoru Pretsednika Republike sa deset članova IK Burmanske sociojalističke partije na čelu sa Ba Šveom i U Čo Njenom, 9. 1. 1959.

80 AJ, 837, I-2/11-4, Zabeleške o razgovorima druga Pretsednika sa Pretsednikom indijske vlade Dž. Nehruom, 13-19. 1. 1959.

81 „Одговор југословенске владе на ноту владе СССР“, *Борба*, 4. 2. 1959.

82 „Југославија има неоспорно право да учествује у решавању немачког питања“, *Борба*, 10. 5. 1959.

83 DA MSP RS, PA, 1960, f. 83, dos. 9, dok. 43590, Zabeleška o kursu SPD na „zajedničku spoljnu politiku“ s vladom (period važnijih događaja u SPD od sredine 1959. do jula 1960).

question. Without allies in Europe, Yugoslavia turned to other continents in search of support.⁸⁴

Yugoslavia, the German question and the Third World

By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the attention of world powers, as well as both German states, was increasingly focused on the non-European world. The decolonization of 17 African countries and especially the crisis in Congo, placed Africa in the focus of the global public.⁸⁵ The same events placed the African continent in the centre of attention of Yugoslav diplomacy, which turned its focus more and more intensively to this part of the world in the second half of the 1950s. The 15th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960, when Josip Broz Tito himself headed the Yugoslav delegation, was an opportunity for establishing Yugoslav-African contacts. Although the "Initiative of the Five" - Tito, Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno and Nkrumah - aimed at mediating between the great powers, did not receive support in the General Assembly, it was an indicator of growing awareness among non-engaged countries that they were a factor of peace and détente in international relations.⁸⁶

In order to further connect with the newly liberated countries, in February 1961, Tito embarked on a two-month visit to Africa. On that occasion, he visited Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. Unlike the Afro-Asian visit of 1958-59, when the Berlin and German question were an integral part of almost every meeting and joint statement, Yugoslav transcripts of conversations during the 1961 African visit indicate that the German question was not raised at all as a topic in meetings with African leaders.⁸⁷ This does not mean that the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs did not monitor the positions of the newly liberated African countries towards the German question and the

84 Wolfgang Schmidt, „Willy Brandts Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik“, in: Bernd Rother (Hrsg.), Bernd Rother (Hrsg.), *Willy Brandts Außenpolitik*, (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag, 2014), 20; Christoph Meyer, *Herbert Wehner: Biographie*, (München, dtv, 2006), 212-223.

85 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

86 Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 88-95.

87 See the notes on the talks held during the visit to African countries: AJ, 837, I-2/13, k. 49, Strogo poverljivo, Materijali i dokumenti o posetama druga Predsednika afričkim zemljama februar-april 1961.

efforts of Bonn and East Berlin to make an economic and political breakthrough in Africa.⁸⁸ However, Tito set out for Africa convinced of the need for a conference of non-aligned countries, and the talks he had in African capitals were aimed at mutual acquaintance, finding common denominators in foreign policy and internal development, i.e. probing for the planned summit.⁸⁹

Both Tito's overseas journeys (1958–1959 and 1961) drew criticism from the Eastern Bloc over Yugoslavia's policy in the Third World. In 1961, East Berlin labelled Yugoslav influence on the "young" nation-states as "harmful" and "dangerous". Yugoslavia was considered to be merely a means of "transmission" of interests of the "imperialist powers", i.e. a "Trojan horse" working against the policy of the socialist bloc.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, when the conference was announced, the East German Foreign Ministry took up the position that "progressive elements" would succeed in imposing themselves as a decisive force at the conference. At the same time, East Berlin had the opportunity to use the preparations for the conference to promote its own "fight for a peace treaty and a solution to the West Berlin question."⁹¹

On the other hand, the West German Foreign Ministry was not very worried about the Belgrade summit.⁹² Unlike East Berlin, which, supported by Moscow and the Eastern Bloc, campaigned throughout the summer across the non-European world, Bonn believed that supposedly unconditioned economic assistance was a sufficient guarantee for the political affiliation of the "young" African countries.⁹³ It was also believed that, in the

88 The preparatory materials for the visit covered the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic towards African countries, especially their economic cooperation. See: AJ, 837, I-2/13, k. 20, DSIP, VI Odeljenje, Dopunske teme o problemima Afrike februar 1961. See also: DA MSP RS, PA, 1961, f. 91, dok. 414842, Problematika pomoći nerazvijenim zemljama i uticaj SRN na tu pomoć; DA MSP RS, PA, 1961, f. 90, dok. 439167, Aktivnost Zapadne Nemačke na području Afrike, 21. 1. 1961; DA MSP RS, PA, 1961, f. 88, dok. 412610, Zabeleška B. Pavlovića, I sekretara, o Međunarodnoj konferenciji o neokolonijalizmu i politici obe nemačke države prema nacionalno-oslobodilačkoj borbi naroda, Lajpcig, 5–8. 4. 1961; DA MSP RS, PA, 1961, f. 88, dok. 419267, Telegram Vošnjaka DSIP-u, 16. 6. 1961.

89 Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција несврстаних земаља 1–6. септембра 1961*, 149.

90 PA AA, MfAA, A5298, Zu einigen Problemen bei der Gestaltung der Politik Jugoslawiens gegenüber den jungen Nationalstaaten, 3. 8. 1961.

91 PA AA, MfAA, A 13346, MfAA, Vorlage für das Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 7. 7. 1961.

92 PA AA, B 12/336, Weber an das AA, Kairo, 14. 6. 1961.

93 William Glenn Grey, *Germany's Cold War*, 125–6.

case of Yugoslavia, the “difficult internal political and economic situation” would be the guarantor of a restrained position towards the German and Berlin question.⁹⁴ However, until mid-August, there were no other serious foreign policy initiatives. What sounded the alarm and made it clear to Bonn officials that the German question would undoubtedly be the topic of Belgrade talks, were the unexpected events of August 13, i.e. the closing of the crossings between West and Soviet sectors of the divided city.

Yugoslavia and the German Question during the preparation for the Belgrade Conference

During the summer of 1961, the attention of the Yugoslav leadership and diplomatic service was mostly focused on the organization of a conference of non-aligned states. However, the developments in Berlin and Germany were kept in focus as well. Especially having in mind that two days before the beginning of the preparatory meeting in Cairo, another summit which was supposed to lead to an agreement, this time between Khrushchev and Kennedy, took place in Vienna. However, this meeting did not produce a solution, but resulted in the renewal of Khrushchev’s ultimatum on the Berlin question.⁹⁵ In consequence, the preparatory meeting in Cairo also started in an atmosphere charged with renewed tension over Berlin. Even though participants agreed in principle that the agenda of the conference should not include issues of regional or particular character, the German question imposed itself as a topic of relevance for presentations and discussions due to its relevance and importance, and the fact that “it poses a dangerous threat to peace”.⁹⁶

Consequently, the interest of both the East and the West concerning the way the German question was to be addressed at the conference of the non-aligned in Belgrade began to grow. The US Ambassador in Belgrade, George Kennan, discussed the German question with the Yugoslav president,⁹⁷ and Charles Bowles, the US Under Secretary of State, arrived from Washington at the end of July to explain once again the US position

94 PA AA, B 12/336, Forschungsdienst Osteuropa an das AA, betr. Reise des jugoslawischen Außenministers Popovic nach Moskau und Konferenz neutraler Staaten in Belgrad, 1. 9. 1961.

95 Aleksandr Fursenko, Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War*, 353–365.

96 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Konsultacije sa vladama zemalja učesnica Beogradske konferencije; Zabeleška o nekim aktuelnim pitanjima u vezi konferencije, 16. 8. 1961.

97 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Doc. No. 93, „Memorandum of Conversation, Brioni, July 17, 1961“

on Berlin and try to encourage Tito “to use his influence” at the Belgrade conference to restrain anti-American tendencies.⁹⁸ Soviet diplomats in Belgrade⁹⁹ and East Berlin¹⁰⁰ also inquired about Yugoslavia’s stance. The issue was again raised during Koča Popović’s visit to the USSR in early July 1961.¹⁰¹ According to Vošnjak, the Yugoslav Ambassador to German Democratic Republic, “it is no longer a question of whether a separate peace treaty will be signed at the end of 1961, but which countries, outside of the Soviet Bloc, will sign this agreement.”¹⁰² One of the key differences between the Soviet and the Yugoslav positions was in fact the attitude towards a separate peace treaty, i.e. the argument that Tito had in mind when he told the American ambassador Kennan that “their view on Germany was similar but not identical with that of the Russians”.¹⁰³ Yugoslavia feared unilateral actions, which could only further aggravate not only the international situation, but Yugoslavia’s relations with the West as well. In essence, Yugoslavia believed that the signing of a separate peace agreement would not solve the tensions in the heart of Europe. The peace treaty, Yugoslavia thought, should be the result of diffusion, not aggravation of the international situation.¹⁰⁴

The official Yugoslavia’s stance towards the German question remained in its essence unchanged, but, by the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, in parallel with the shaping of the policy of non-engagement, a significant change occurred in its approach to resolving the German question. In 1959, Yugoslavia was faced with the fact that neither the East nor the West supported its efforts to directly participate in a con-

98 Телеграм Амбасаде у Југославији Стејт департменту, 31. 7. 1961“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 385–387.

99 Ђоко Трипковић, *Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 116–117.

100 DA MSP RS, PA, 1961, f. 93, dos. 3, dok. 422962, Neki aspekti aktuelne situacije u vezi MU sa Nemačkom, 28. 6. 1961.

101 „Документ бр. 21, Запис беседе Х. С. Хрущева с государственным секретарем по иностранным делам ФНРЮ К. Поповичем во время визита в СССР, 8. 7. 1961“, у: *Југославија–СССР*, 407–417.

102 DA MSP RS, PA, 1961, f. 93, dos. 3, dok. 422962, Neki aspekti aktuelne situacije u vezi MU sa Nemačkom, 28. 6. 1961.

103 FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Doc. No. 93, „Memorandum of Conversation, Brioni, July 17, 1961“, p. 194.

104 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Zabeleška o zaključcima sa sastanka jugoslovenske delegacije održanog 25. avgusta 1961. godine. On the issue of signing a separate peace agreement with GDR, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs held that Yugoslavia would not gain anything from it, and that potentially, it could be interpreted as giving up the right to reparations. DA MSP RS, PA, 1961, f. 93, dok. 425638, Stav prema eventualnom separatnom mirovnom ugovoru sa DR Nemačkom, 21. 8. 1961.

ference on resolving the German question, albeit being a victim of German aggression, member of the anti-Hitler coalition and a country pursuing a non-bloc policy. The Yugoslav leadership realised that only with the support of a considerable number of other non-bloc countries, its stance on important international issues, including the German question, could influence the course of world politics. The forthcoming Belgrade Conference was deemed a suitable forum.¹⁰⁵

The German and Berlin questions were topical during the summer of 1961, which made the Yugoslav side conclude - "We must also maintain the focus on this problem."¹⁰⁶ The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs considered that for most African and Asian countries, except for India, Indonesia, Burma and the UAR, the German question was an issue of "minor interest and secondary importance", and that they paid attention to it only when it acutely threatened the world peace. The Yugoslav side argued that the reasons were multiple - geographical distance, understanding of the German question as a "European question", misunderstanding of the substance of the German problem and complete ignorance of the nature of "German revanchism".¹⁰⁷ That is exactly why they thought that the Yugoslavia's position must be "more concrete".¹⁰⁸ It was believed that "most countries will basically follow the position of Yugoslavia."¹⁰⁹ Hence, Yugoslavia's responsibility for the tone of the discussion on the German question was even greater. Conference should act in two directions. On the one hand, it should influence both the East and the West to take more conciliatory positions and engage in negotiations on the question of Germany and Berlin. On the other hand, it was desirable for the conference to have a long-term impact on the recognition of existing "realities" in Germany, i.e. the existence of two German states and the inviolability of current borders as an "objective basis" for the resolution of the German question.¹¹⁰ A substantial novelty in the Yugoslavia's stance was the opinion that the German and Berlin questions should not

105 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Zabeleška o zaključcima sa sastanka jugoslovenske delegacije održanog 25. avgusta 1961. godine.

106 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Zabeleška o zaključcima sa sastanka jugoslovenske delegacije održanog 25. avgusta 1961. godine.

107 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Nemačka i Berlin (materijal za Beogradsku konferenciju).

108 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Zabeleška o nekim aktuelnim pitanjima u vezi konferencije, 16. 8. 1961; Zabeleška o zaključcima sa sastanka jugoslovenske delegacije održanog 25. avgusta 1961. godine.

109 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Bilten Državnog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove o konferenciji neangažovanih zemalja, br. 7. Strogo poverljivo.

110 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Nemačka i Berlin (materijal za Beogradsku konferenciju).

be treated as a regional, European problem. It was considered that the previous interpretation of this issue simply as a consequence of the World War II was wrong. The conference was supposed to broaden this position and add that the Berlin crisis was not only a consequence of the previous war, but also a reflection of ongoing preparations for a new world war and "therefore, it is our common problem, and the non-engaged have the right to have their say."¹¹¹

The Belgrade Conference

The Belgrade Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries opened on 1 September 1961, nineteen days after the units of the German Democratic Republic's army and police closed 192 Berlin streets, 32 railways, 8 city railway lines, 4 subway lines and 3 highways with barbed wire and barricades, to begin the construction of the Berlin Wall. Immediately after the closure of the Berlin sectors, East German officials headed to the capitals of non-bloc countries, participants in the Belgrade Conference, which they believed could decisively influence the debate on the Berlin question – to New Delhi, Jakarta, Havana, Accra, Conakry, Bamako and Belgrade.¹¹² A special working group dedicated to the preparations for the Belgrade Conference was established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR. Memoranda on the German question and the peace treaty issue were sent to all participants. East German envoy to Belgrade Eleonore Staimer received detailed instructions for propaganda work during the Conference. Belgrade was the only capital of the non-bloc world where East Germany had a significant advantage over West Germany. Namely, unlike the West Germans, the East Germans had their diplomatic mission in Belgrade. However, this was not the only advantage. The Government in Bonn was far less prepared. The first serious propaganda activities followed only after August 13, when memoirs on the German question and a letter from Chancellor Adenauer were distributed throughout the Third World. It will turn out that such an approach

111 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Zabeleška o zaključcima sa sastanka jugoslovenske delegacije održanog 25. avgusta 1961. godine.

112 Amit das Gupta, *Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin*, 244; Till Florian Tömmel, *Bonn, Jakarta und der Kalte Krieg*, 144–145; William Glenn Grey, *Germany's Cold War*, 126–127; AJ, 837, I-3-a/82-3, Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Predsednika Republike sa specijalnim izaslanikom predsednika Državnog Saveta NDR dr Ernesta Šolca, ministra građevinarstva, 24. avgusta 1961. na Brionima; PA AA, MfAA, A 17171, Bericht über den Besuch Sonderbotschafters Scholz in Jugoslawien, 4. 9. 1961.

was still too “dry” and “impersonal” and thus unsuccessful in an attempt to find a common language with leaders of Asia and Africa. That is, as Indonesian President Sukarno pointed out, before the Conference, he received a letter from Bonn, whereas from East Berlin he received the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Plenipotentiary Representative.¹¹³

The first day of the Belgrade Conference, after Tito’s introductory address, began with Sukarno’s speech. “The current conditions should be formalised or legalised”, “All external interference should be terminated”, “The differences in social views should be accepted”, “they [the Germans] should start negotiations by investing serious efforts to reach an agreement”, “They should make at least small initial steps towards understanding and strengthening regular forms of contact”, Sukarno began with an explanation of the German problem. Instead in the context of the right to self-determination, Sukarno spoke about the German question in the context of the necessity of peaceful coexistence and the need to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence to Germany and West Berlin. “Common sense must prevail”, Sukarno pointed out, “and common sense seeks recognition of the temporary *de facto* sovereignty of the two German states”, and “if the Soviet Union wants to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany, let it conclude it”.¹¹⁴ Ghanaian President, Kwame Nkrumah, who arrived in Belgrade from Moscow, was even more direct: “There should be no hypocrisy about the German question. Everyone knows that there are two Germanys, created as a result of the previous war. The conditions that led to their emergence still exist. That is why the peoples of the world should recognise the existence of these two states, in order to enable them to coexist peacefully.”¹¹⁵ Similar views were taken by the Prime Minister of India on the second day of the Conference: “Very important facts should be noted: first, two independent entities, two powers, two countries, the Government of West Germany, the Federal Government and the Government of East Germany, the Government of the German Democratic Republic. It is a fact that does not depend on whether I like it or whether someone else likes it or not, but it is a fact that we must count on if we

113 PA AA, B 42/19, Alfred Heider, Konferenz der Staats- oder Regierungschefs von 25 Ländern in Belgrad, 1–6. 9. 1961.

114 „Ахмед Сукарно (председник Републике Индонезије“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 411.

115 „Кваме Нкрумах (председник Републике Гане)“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 427–428.

want to move forward.”¹¹⁶ Slightly more subtle, but still in the direction of recognising the “reality”, was the speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq Hashim Javad: “The division of Germany into East and West is a reality today, with two different political and economic systems, each of which has its position within the two bloc systems. (...) it is imperative to recognise the real situation and make both parts of Germany a neutral area of the world.”¹¹⁷ Ceylon Prime Minister asked a rhetorical question – “Is there a way to bridge the gap between the two German states and to reconcile interests of the two blocs that caused that division?” In her opinion, “this problem will not be solved if the governments in question continue to insist on legal arguments of a technical nature”, which was a clear, albeit implicit, criticism of the West German government.¹¹⁸

Support to the East Germans reached its peak on the third day of the conference, with the already quoted speech of the Yugoslav President. Two levels of Tito’s argument could be recognised. On the one hand, he outlined steps that, in his opinion, could lead to easing the acute international tension. They entailed, above all, negotiations between East and West as a way to reach a peace treaty with Germany. Then, the recognition of the existence of the two German states and the inviolability of their borders. And, finally, negotiations between East and West Germany, as a way towards gradual rapprochement and reunification. On the other hand, defying to some extent the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, Tito referred to the internal order of the two German states and the future unified Germany. These parts of Tito’s speech clearly testify to the ideological dimension of the Yugoslav stance towards the German question. Motivated by the ever-present fear of a strong German state in the heart of Europe and convinced that most participants at the Belgrade Conference did not know the true nature of “German revanchism”,¹¹⁹ Tito particularly emphasised in his speech the threat to Europe and the world if “reactionary and fascist forces” ruled Germany. The only way for Germany not to be a threat to peace, in Tito’s opinion, was for it to embark on the path of “democratisation”, which essentially meant strengthening, as the Yugoslavs had repeatedly pointed

116 „Цавахарлал Нехру (председник владе Републике Индије)“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 434.

117 „Хашим Цавад (министар спољних послова Ирака)“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 442.

118 „Сиримаво Банданараике (председница Владе Цејлона)“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 458.

119 AJ, 837, I-4-a, k. 202, Nemačka i Berlin (materijal za Beogradsku konferenciju).

out, “internal democratic forces”. The guarantor of the “democratic” nature of Germany in the first post-war years was the Soviet Union, and the “internal democratic forces” were recognised among the German Communists. From the early 1950s, those were the German Social Democrats, and since the mid-1950s, the key to a “democratic” Germany was increasingly sought in cooperation and rapprochement between the West German Social Democrats, i.e. their “left wing”, and the East German Communists. In the meantime, it was necessary to avoid the possibility that the increasingly powerful West German state, “fraught ... with the remnants of fascist and revanchist views”, “swallows” East Germany whose development nevertheless embarked on the path of socialism.¹²⁰ Although undoubtedly closer to the East German and Soviet views on the German question, Tito’s speech did not support East German efforts in all aspects. This primarily referred to the issue of a separate peace treaty. Tito believed that signing a peace treaty with both German states, which would give international guarantees to their, at least temporary existence, as well as to the inviolability of the current borders, would be a positive step. Neither Tito nor other Yugoslav diplomats supported the unilateral signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany alone.

The Social Democratic press in West Germany wrote: “Hallstein Doctrine is dead.”¹²¹ The *DPA* reported that “the outcome of the Belgrade Conference can be described as *Stalingrad* of West German foreign policy”.¹²² Just two weeks before West German parliamentary elections, the government in Bonn was facing the greatest challenge so far to their foreign policy doctrine of isolating East Germany. Day in, day out, news arrived from Belgrade about, for Bonn’s interests, extremely negative attitudes of the leaders of non-engaged countries.¹²³ It turned out that the reaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was determined to show resoluteness on this issue, was far more important and influential than direct contacts in Belgrade. Even before the end of the Conference, Foreign Minister von Brentano, through the West German media, tried to make it clear to the leaders gathered in Belgrade that the recognition of the GDR,

120 „Говор Председника Тита у Генералној Дебати“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 447-448.

121 „Noch eine Atempause für Bonn? Neutrale neutralisierten sich“, *SPD-Pressedienst*, 6. 9. 1961.

122 See East German report on reactions in the FGR, in: PA AA, MfAA, A 17171.

123 See a series of telegrams from Paris on the stances of the leaders of non-engaged countries towards the German and Berlin questions at the Belgrade Conference in: PA AA, B 12/336.

as well as the signing of a separate peace treaty, would undoubtedly lead to the severance of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, on the last day of the Conference the Government of the Federal Republic issued a statement that the recognition of East Germany would lead to the abolition of hitherto nominally politically unrelated development aid.¹²⁴

The final act of the Belgrade Conference, *The Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries*, published on 6 September 1961, contained a compromising position on the German question. Yugoslavia's proposal expressed in the draft Declaration, which included recognising the existence of the two German states as a way to a peaceful solution to the German question, did not receive support. While the Ghanaian delegation advocated for the Yugoslav proposal, the representatives of India and Egypt made significant efforts to prevent it. Nehru held a series of private meetings to reassure representatives of other countries that any statement in favour of one side or the other would only add fuel to the fire. In the committee tasked with drafting the declaration, the Indian Minister of Defence Krishna Menon opposed entering any "provocative" comment regarding the German question, while Nasser influenced the representatives of the Arab countries, emphasising Bonn's political and economic support to the Arab states of the Middle East.¹²⁵ The *Declaration*, however, stated that "the German problem is not merely a regional problem, but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in international relations", which gave legitimacy to non-aligned countries to demand the right to vote on it. However, the only thing the participants could agree on was the call to renounce the use of force in solving the German and Berlin problems.¹²⁶

The East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs was satisfied with the statement of the leaders of the non-bloc world on the German question.¹²⁷ It was the first conference in which the representatives of African countries expressed their position on the German question, and the majority was of the opinion that in solving this problem, one must start from

124 William Glenn Grey, *Germany's Cold War*, 129–130.

125 Amit Das Gupta, "The non-aligned and the German question", in: *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*, 152.

126 „Декларација шефова држава и влада ванблоковских земаља“, у: Драган Богетић, Љубодраг Димић, *Београдска конференција*, 485.

127 PA AA, MfAA, A 17171, Zur Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten in Belgrad vom 1.–5. September 1961, Berlin, den 23. 9. 1961; PA AA, MfAA, A 14336, Vorläufige Information über die Belgrader Konferenz.

the fact of existence of two German states.¹²⁸ Despite the disappointment in the attitude of Nasser and the Arab states at the Conference, they concluded that, on the whole, the Belgrade Conference supported the views of the GDR.¹²⁹ Although the Belgrade Conference did not result in a chain recognition of the German Democratic Republic, the maintenance of the Hallstein Doctrine would have an increasingly tangible, material price for Bonn in the coming years. As it was pointed out in the subsequent analysis by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, “the so-called Hallstein Doctrine was exposed to the biggest burden test in Belgrade, ever” – “this time, it survived, but the question arises whether it will last for a long time”.¹³⁰

Yugoslavia and the German Question before the Cairo Conference

When the Cairo Conference was announced, the GDR was, at least formally, in a better position than prior to the Belgrade Conference.¹³¹ In January 1963, Cuba established diplomatic relations with East Berlin, which resulted in the second application of the Hallstein Doctrine and the severance of relations between West Germany and Cuba.¹³² A year later, the newly liberated Zanzibar established diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. A month later, in February 1964, the East German mission in Colombo was granted the status of the Consulate General. Despite the fact that the GDR had consulates general in five other countries at the time, the Government in Bonn reacted sharply, cancelling the entire development aid to Ceylon.¹³³ There were two main reasons. On the one hand, due to the fear that the opening of the Consulate General in Colombo would lead to a similar success of the GDR in India, and on the other hand, in light of the fact that Ceylon was chosen as the host of the prepara-

128 PA AA, MfAA, A 17171, Einschätzung des Auftretens afrikanischer Staaten auf der Belgrader Konferenz, 15. 9. 1961.

129 PA AA, MfAA, A 12618, Zur Haltung der VAR zu einigen Hauptproblemen der Konferenz der „nichtpaktgebundenen“ Staaten in Belgrad vom 1.–6. 9. 196, Kairo, 18. 9. 1961.

130 PA AA, B 12/336, Gipfelkonferenz ungebundener Staaten in Belgrad.

131 At the end of 1963, East German diplomats noted that a “New Belgrade Conference” could take place in autumn 1964. In the previous period, the East German diplomacy had carefully been keeping track of Yugoslavia’s relations with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. See documents in: PA AA, MfAA, A 5299.

132 William Glenn Grey, *Germany’s Cold War*, 138–139.

133 *Ibid.*, 155–162.

tory meeting for the new conference of the non-aligned. Taught by experience of the Belgrade Conference, the leaders in East Berlin hoped that the new summit of the non-engaged countries could provide an opportunity for a diplomatic breakthrough and chain recognition. To that end, an East German delegation visited Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon and India in February 1964. Furthermore, East German diplomats addressed the governments in Colombo and Belgrade with a request to advocate for the chain recognition of the GDR at the forthcoming conference.¹³⁴

Taught by experience of the Belgrade Conference, Bonn embarked more seriously than ever on a campaign to discredit the German Democratic Republic with the aim of preventing the chain recognition of the GDR by the Third World countries.¹³⁵ Similar to East Berlin, Bonn also planned to send a number of emissaries, representatives from the world of politics, journalism, economy, and culture. It was necessary to ensure the uninterrupted flow of West German development aid. Furthermore, East German accusations that Bonn supported apartheid and allied with Portugal against the liberation movements in Lusophone Africa had to be neutralised.¹³⁶ Special attention was to be paid to potentially volatile countries. In its efforts, Bonn could count on full support of the Western allies.¹³⁷

Receiving the request from East Berlin, and probably in fear of further economic pressures from the West, Ceylon representatives addressed the Yugoslav embassy with a request that Yugoslavia come to the fore and examine the possibilities of a collective recognition of East Germany, or at least a possibility of adopting a position on the existence of two German states at the upcoming non-aligned conference.¹³⁸ The East Germans also addressed the Yugoslavs with the same request, knowing that Yugoslavia was one of the fiercest opponents of the Hallstein Doc-

134 DA MSP RS, PA, 1964, f. 71, dos. 43558, Zabeleška o rezultatima posete vladine delegacije NDR na čelu sa Lojšnerom zemljama Jugoistočne Azije, 22. 2. 1964; DA MSP RS, PA, 1964, f. 71, dos. 47486, Zabeleška o razgovoru sa pomoćnikom državnog sekretara Mirka Tepavca sa otpravnikom poslova DR Nemačke Herbert Šlageom, 11. 3. 1964; DA MSP RS, PA, 1964, f. 71, dok. 49065, Telegram Fejića DSIP-u, kairo, 18. 3. 1964; DA MSP RS, PA, 1964, f. 71, dok. 49988, Telegram Uvalića DSIP-u, Delhi, 20. 3. 1964.

135 William Glenn Grey, *Germany's Cold War*, 133-161.

136 PA AA, B 40/99, Hausbesprechung über die kommende Neutralistenkonferenz, 8. 5. 1964; PA AA, B 40/99, Zweite Hausbesprechung über die kommende Neutralistenkonferenz, 17. 7. 1964.

137 William Glenn Grey, *Germany's Cold War*, 164; PAAA, B40/99, Zweite Hausbesprechung über die kommende Neutralistenkonferenz, 17. 7. 1964.

138 AJ, 837, I-4-a/5, Pregled aktivnosti i informacija o novoj konferenciji neangažovanih zemalja, br. 1.

trine.¹³⁹ While two years earlier Yugoslavia's policy on the Third World had been considered "revisionist" and "petty-bourgeois", in early 1964 the East German Foreign Ministry estimated that Yugoslavia's influence among Asian and African countries was, due to rapprochement with the USSR and the Chinese policy on the Third World, in full accordance with the interests of socialist countries, and that its reputation among non-bloc countries was first-class.¹⁴⁰ Yugoslav diplomats expected that the "pressure from the GDR on us to be the main bearer of the burden of accomplishing their goals" would only increase.¹⁴¹

However, the Yugoslav response was disappointing, perhaps even surprising. Stressing that the Yugoslavia's stance on the German question was familiar and that Yugoslav representatives would express their views openly in talks with delegates from non-engaged countries, they added that Yugoslavia had raised the German question at the Belgrade Conference "and we all know how it ended", alluding to the fact that Yugoslav proposals had not been accepted in the joint declaration. In addition, it was stressed to the Ceylon Government that preparations for the new conference of non-engaged countries should cover only key issues, and that the issue of "recognition of the GDR could not be first and foremost".¹⁴²

At the pre-conference in Colombo (23-29 March 1964), a draft agenda of the upcoming summit was adopted. At the proposal of Indonesia, the issue of "divided nations" was on the agenda. Although the Indonesian goal was to discuss the dispute with Malaysia over Borneo, the issue of "divided nations" certainly included the issues of Korea, Vietnam and Germany as well. According to Yugoslav estimates, India was against the action of collective recognition of East Germany under the pretext that it should not interfere with internal affairs of other nations. Although having previously initiated an action of collective recognition of the GDR, at the time of the pre-conference, the opinion of the Ceylon Government was that such an action would fail, but that efforts should be made to adopt an opinion on the need for contacts – economic, trade, and others – between two German states. Mali's position was that it would support

139 PA AA, MfAA, A 5137, Kurzdisposition über Probleme der Beziehungen Westdeutschland-Jugoslawien, 15. 3. 1961.

140 PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, Einschätzung der jugoslawischen Haltung zur Vorbereitung einer zweiten Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten, 12. 6. 1964.

141 DA MSP RS, PA, 1964, f. 71, dok. 48970, Telegram Jovića DSIP-u, 16. 3. 1964.

142 AJ, 837, I-4-a/5, Pregled aktivnosti i informacija o novoj konferenciji neangažovanih zemalja, br. 2.

the recognition of the GDR, but that it could not initiate such an action.¹⁴³ Given the stances of key non-engaged countries on the German question, as well as the fact that, unlike in 1961, the German and Berlin questions were no longer an acute hotbed of the crisis, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs was of the opinion that most conference participants' stances towards the divided countries would be of a principled nature and be limited to the necessity of peaceful resolution of problems, easing of tensions and positive action of non-bloc states.¹⁴⁴

East Berlin realised that Yugoslav representatives would undoubtedly point out the existence of the two German states as a fact, but that Yugoslavia could not be expected to initiate a chain recognition of the GDR, although it would support such an initiative of other participants. Internally, the East Germans believed that Yugoslavia, for the sake of positioning itself among non-engaged countries, subordinated too much its foreign policy positions and aligned them with the positions and interests of the non-bloc world.¹⁴⁵ Indeed, Yugoslavia did not push for a chain recognition of the GDR at the Colombo conference, because it was aware that most participants would not dare to support the proposal. Given the easing of tensions in Europe, no measures should have been taken that could be "an element of aggravation, instead of being a step closer to resolving basic issues". At the same time, given the "major interests" that the SFRY had in West Germany, it was not necessary to further strain relations with Bonn without much need. In other words, in specific issues such as the proposal to initiate a group recognition of East Germany, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs weighed the Yugoslav response so as not to jeopardize its non-bloc positions and worsen its relations with West Germany, if it was estimated that the initiative would not ultimately benefit East Germany.¹⁴⁶

At the end of July 1964, the GDR envoy to Belgrade, Eleonore Staimer, requested an urgent reception from the Yugoslav president. The

143 AJ, 837, I-4-a/5, Pregled aktivnosti i informacija o novoj konferenciji neangažovanih zemalja, br. 4; DA MSP RS, PA, 1964, f. 71, dos. 43558, Zabeleška o rezultatima posete vladine delegacije NDR na čelu sa Lojšnerom zemljama Jugoistočne Azije, 22. 2. 1964.

144 AJ, 837, I-4-a/5, DSIP, Materijal za Drugu konferenciju neangažovanih zemalja: „Nove snage“ (indonežanska inicijativa); Podeljene nacije (indonežanski predlog).

145 PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, Zur Haltung der wichtigsten neutralen Staaten zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung der 2. Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten im Oktober d. J. in Kairo, 30. 6. 1964.

146 AJ, 837, I-3-a/82-6, Informacija o Nemačkoj Demokratskoj Republici i bilateralni odnosi sa SFRJ (povodom prijema zamenika predsednika vlade Bruno Lojšnera), 13. 5. 1964.

reason was Walter Ulbricht's official visit to Bulgaria.¹⁴⁷ Tito received the East German envoy in Brioni islands almost three weeks later, expressing his satisfaction with accepting a meeting with Ulbricht during his travels through Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁸ Since the autumn of 1963, the East Germans repeatedly expressed a desire for an exchange of visits at the highest level, proposing that Ulbricht should visit Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1964. The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs considered that the visit at that moment would serve "almost exclusively the political interests of the GDR", "but not our interests, to the necessary extent", and efforts were made to postpone the visits at the highest level for later.¹⁴⁹ However, at the end of July, the East Germans raised the same question again, but this time in the form of Ulbricht's unofficial visit on the way from Sofia to East Berlin.¹⁵⁰ This was difficult to refuse, without endangering mutual relations. In essence, the Yugoslav side was presented with a *fait accompli*. Although, in Bonn's opinion, the visit was primarily aimed at strengthening the GDR's position within the Eastern Bloc, it was believed that Ulbricht would undoubtedly try to influence Tito's stance on the German question at the upcoming Cairo Conference.¹⁵¹

Ulbricht arrived in Belgrade on 19 September 1964.¹⁵² In his statement, he paid special attention to the German question and West Germany, without mentioning the upcoming Cairo Conference. He emphasised that the precondition for German unification was disarmament and overcoming 'German imperialism'. He added that nowadays there was at least one peaceful German state, East Germany, which limited the strength of German imperialism. Tito's statement on the German question was in line with Ulbricht's. "I have repeatedly stated that it is fortunate that there are two Germanys", that is, "when there can no longer be one true democratic Germany, then it is better to have two of which at least one is democratic". Tito's elaboration was completely ideologically shaped. He point-

147 AJ, 837, I-3-a/82-7, Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Eleonorom Štajmer, Poslanikom NDR, 22. 7. 1964.

148 AJ, 837, I-3-a/82-7, Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Predsednika sa Eleonorom Štajmer, 11. 8. 1964.

149 DA MSP RS, PA, 1964, f. 71, dok. 4247, DSIP, Informacija o nekim pitanjima iz odnosa SFRJ-NDR, 6. 1. 1964; AJ, 837, I-3-a/82-8, Zabeleška povodom predloga Valtera Ulbrihta da se sastane sa drugom Predsednikom 18 ili 19 septembra u Beogradu.

150 AJ, 837, I-3-a/82-8, Zabeleška povodom predloga Valtera Ulbrihta da se sastane sa drugom Predsednikom 18 ili 19 septembra u Beogradu.

151 PA AA, B 130/3129A, Abteilung II, Aufzeichnung betr. Geplanter Besuch Ulbrichts in Jugoslawien, 27. 8. 1964.

152 PA AA, MfAA, A 5364, Program boravka, 19. 9. 1964.

ed out that West Germany was the element that hindered the end of the Cold War, that the Cold War was “holding fast” in West Germany, that the West Germans were “*feeding* on war preparations”, that there were “a lot of old pro-fascist and the most reactionary elements” among them, and that resolving the German question would “take a little longer”. “I have often told our friends in various states that it is necessary to have two German states, because we will reach peace sooner than if there was one German state that would be armed and under the influence of imperialist and aggressive forces”, Tito pointed out.¹⁵³

The Yugoslav President explicitly mentioned the Cairo conference on two occasions. He emphasized that numerous representatives of non-engaged countries would surely ask him for his opinion. In the context of Yugoslavia’s relations with non-engaged countries, Tito tried to convince Ulbricht that Yugoslavia’s non-bloc position was what brought it prestige and influence in the non-European world, and that such a Yugoslav attitude was in the interest of all socialist countries as well. At the end of the talk, Ulbricht also referred to the Cairo Conference. He pointed out that it would be important for the GDR if in Cairo the issue of non-nuclear zones in Europe as well was raised, if a position was taken against multilateral nuclear weapon, and if the representatives of African and Asian countries were informed that “the one who maintains relations only with West Germany is practically under pressure from West German imperialism”.¹⁵⁴

The Cairo Conference

At the Conference in Cairo (5-10 September 1964) there were far fewer words on the German question than three years earlier in Belgrade. Only Keita, President of Mali, and Josip Broz Tito explicitly pointed out the existence of two German states. Nkrumah and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria spoke about the unification of the divided state through the agreement between the two parties. Many speakers emphasised the need for the unification of divided nations, without mentioning Germany, and a significant number of them spoke about the need for self-determination. There was no talk of a peace treaty with Germany.

153 AJ, 837, I-3-a/82-8, Zabeleške o razgovorima predsednika Tita i predsednika Valtera Ulbrihta, 19. 9. 1964.

154 AJ, 837, I-3-a/82-8, Zabeleške o razgovorima predsednika Tita i predsednika Valtera Ulbrihta, 19. 9. 1964.

In his address to the Cairo Conference Tito only briefly referred to the German question. He emphasized that there had been “an ease of tensions with regard to the German question, the solution of which should be sought, above all, in negotiations between the two German states, as a way of enabling the German people to decide on their future”.¹⁵⁵ The analysis of the East German Foreign Ministry indicated that Tito’s remark about the easing of tensions was “wrong”, and that “young nations” continued to underestimate West German “militarism” and “imperialism”. However, they thought that, emphasising the negotiations between the two Germans as a way to resolve the German question, Tito dealt a blow to the “rulers in Bonn”. Although the German question did not have a prominent place at the Conference in Cairo, the East Germans were satisfied with the general tone of the discussion.¹⁵⁶

In West German view, Tito said as little as he could about the German question.¹⁵⁷ Although Yugoslavia did not change its stance on the German question, Tito’s speech in Cairo differed significantly from his “anti-German polemics and initiatives” at the Belgrade Conference. According to the West German Foreign Ministry, the Yugoslavs essentially reverted to the position of the pre-Belgrade conference time.¹⁵⁸ In Bonn, they concluded that Tito’s and Keita’s speeches were the most problematic for the Federal Republic of Germany, but that Tito’s speech was actually “lenient”. Whereas in Belgrade a significant number of participants were inclined to recognise two German “states”, “governments”, or “countries”, the atmosphere at the Cairo Conference very much differed. The German question was marginal, and Bonn assessed the outcome of the Cairo Conference as a “success of German policy”.¹⁵⁹

The Cairo Conference did not bring about substantial changes regarding the German question. East Berlin could celebrate it as a “verbal victory” and proof of the failure of the Hallstein Doctrine. However, not only was the issue of collective recognition of the GDR not raised at the Cairo Conference, and the existence of two German states not included in

155 AJ, 837, I-4-a/5, Govor na Drugoj konferenciji šefova država i vlada neangažovanih zemalja, Kairo, 6. 10. 1964.

156 PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, Einschätzung der jugoslawischen Haltung zur Vorbereitung einer zweiten Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten, 2. 11. 1964.

157 AJ, 837, I-4.-a/5, Bilten br. 7, 7. 10. 1964.

158 PA AA, B 130/3129A, Deutsch-jugoslawische Beziehungen, Anwendung der „Ostblockklausel“ auf Jugoslawien, Bonn, 11. 12. 1964.

159 PA AA, B 40/99, Die zweite Konferenz der ungebundenen Staaten in Kairo vom 5.-10. Oktober 1964 und das Deutschlandproblem, 30. 10. 1964.

the final document, but the German question took up far less space than three years earlier in Belgrade. With that in mind, the Bonn Government could be pleased with the outcome. There were no changes in Yugoslavia's stance towards the German question either. However, what became apparent at the Cairo Conference was that for most non-engaged countries, the German question was of secondary importance, except in moments when it represented an acute hotbed of the crisis, as was the case in 1961. Unlike most, the Yugoslav leaders saw the German question as one of the vital issues. Therefore, it became obvious, in Cairo at the latest, that the keys to solving the German problem were in Europe.

Conclusion

In the mid-1950s, the Yugoslavia's stance towards the German question changed under the influence of numerous factors. West Germany's entry into the NATO, and then the formation of the Warsaw Pact, of which East Germany became a member, seemed to cement German division and postpone German unification. Fearing West Germany's economic and military ascend, and drawing closer to the Eastern Bloc, Yugoslavia gradually began seeing socialist East Germany as a counterweight to the rising German "militarism". Through contacts with non-European countries, the Yugoslav leadership learned that many of them had far more developed relations with East Germany than Yugoslavia. Altogether, it influenced the authorities in Belgrade to take the position that the existence of two German states was a reality that should be accepted, that the path to German unification should lead through negotiations between representatives of the two German states, and potentially through some kind of (con)federation, and that the Polish-German border on the Oder and the Neisse was inviolable. After the mid-1950s, the Yugoslav stance towards the German question did not change substantially. Although in the midst of the "second ideological conflict" with the USSR, when the Berlin crisis escalated, Tito supported Soviet proposals for resolving the Berlin and German questions during his visits to Asia and Africa in the winter of 1958/59. Therefore, Tito's views on the German question expressed at the Belgrade Conference did not represent a deviation from the previous Yugoslavia's positions, that is, they were not a consequence of the warming of relations with the Soviet Union. Although very similar, Yugoslav and Soviet stances towards the German question during the second Berlin crisis were still not identical. The key difference was the stance towards a

separate peace treaty with East Germany. As a matter of fact, at no time, not even at the Belgrade Conference, did the Yugoslav leadership provide public support to concluding a separate peace agreement with the GDR.

Although there were no substantial changes in Yugoslavia's stance towards the German question after 1955, the tactic changed. Attempts to play an active role in resolving the German question during 1959, were not supported by the West and the East alike. The failure of the Geneva Conference in 1959 and the summit in Paris the following year, as well as the loss of support of the West German Social Democrats, strengthened Yugoslavia's belief that the great powers would not agree on a solution to these burning European and global problems any time soon. The accelerated pace of decolonisation paved the way for new alliances, and Tito learned that Yugoslavia had to join forces with other non-bloc countries in order to make its voice heard. For most states of the Third World the German question was not of vital interest. In Yugoslav view, they were not aware of the "true nature of German revanchism", and Yugoslavia was therefore responsible for the stances other non-bloc countries would take towards the German question.

The Belgrade Conference began less than three weeks after the construction of the Berlin Wall. Almost all participants touched upon the German question their speeches. Tito's speech was harsh, but it brought no changes to the Yugoslav stance towards Germany. He was not alone in his view that the existence of two German states was a reality. However, this position was not included in the Final Act, nor did the Conference result in chain recognition of East Germany. The Cairo Conference took place in a completely different international setting when it came to the German question. Although there were no substantial changes in Yugoslavia's stance as compared to previous years, the Yugoslav leadership became aware that the German question was of secondary importance to most non-aligned countries, except when it posed an acute threat to world peace. With that in mind, it was clear in Cairo at the latest that the solution to the German question lay in Europe.

Yugoslavia and the Two German States during the 1968 Turmoil

The year of 1968 was full of challenges. It was a year marked by riots. Waves of protests and demands for freedom also hit the streets of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo. The Yugoslav leadership faced criticism

of the discrepancy between the theory and practice of self-governing socialism, with student demonstrations and revolts coming from the left. At the same time, it faced a long-standing national, economic, state, and social crisis. The challenges faced were the rising unemployment, the hopelessness of the youth, the unproductiveness of the economy, the financial over-indebtedness, all of which threatened to shake faith in the success of Yugoslavia's path to socialism.¹⁶⁰ The protests also posed an ideological challenge to the ruling structures of the western countries. Protesters, mostly students and youth, sought an alternative to the ruling socio-political order, highlighting the most radical Third World leaders as role models. West German authorities were particularly sensitive, as they always considered the protests from the left as a warning and a reminder that for German citizens there was another German state of communist orientation to which they could turn.¹⁶¹ While they watched with pleasure the riots on the streets of Paris, West Berlin and other western cities, the leaders of Eastern European countries found themselves struck by requests for liberation among their own ranks. The biggest challenges came from Prague, where the process of political liberalization and greater openness to the West began with the arrival of Aleksandar Dubček at the helm of the Czechoslovak party. However, the entry of the Warsaw Pact troops into Prague and Bratislava on the night of 20-21 August 1968 marked the end of the "Prague Spring" and the beginning of political and ideological discipline throughout Eastern Europe. At the same time, the intervention in the name of "socialist internationalism" led to a new polarization in Europe, making 1968 one of those years that imposed the necessity of foreign policy determination and alignment.¹⁶²

160 More info on Yugoslavia and the year of 1968 can be found in: *1968 – четрдесет година после. Зборник радова*, ур. Радмила Радић, (Београд: ИНИС, 2008); Hrvoje Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968*, (Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2012); *Шездесет осма – личне историје. 80 сведочења*, прир. Ђорђе Малавразић, (Београд: Радио Београд 2/Службени гласник, 2008); *Право на побуну: '68. код нас и у свету. Зборник радова са научног скупа одржаног 4. јуна 2018. године*, ур. Љубодраг Димић, Војислав Г. Павловић, (Београд: САНУ/Балканолошки институт САНУ, 2021).

161 See: *Between Prague Spring and French May. Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960–1980*, eds. Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder and Joachim Scharloth, (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011); Quinn Slobodian, *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany*, (Duke University Press, 2012); Mark Kurlansky, *1968. The Year that Rocked the World*, (London: Random House Publishing Group, 2004).

162 More info on the Prague Spring and the intervention in Czechoslovakia can be found in the collection of documents: *The Prague Spring '68*, ed. Jaromír Navrátil, (Budapest/New York: CEU Press, 2006).

Particularly sensitive to situations that require political affiliation were those states that, like Yugoslavia, were not tied to military-political blocs. The aim of this paper is to re-examine Yugoslavia's policy of non-aligning with the blocs on the example of its policy on the German question and relations with two German states during the turbulent 1968. It will try to answer the question of how the Yugoslav leadership coped with these turbulent times and whether it managed to maintain the international position it had built up until then through the analysis of three sets of events in which mutual relations between Yugoslavia, East and West Germany were reflected. First of all, the renewal of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and West Germany, the ways in which the Yugoslav diplomacy tried to present and use this act, as well as the reactions of East Berlin will be analysed. The second set of events to be analysed are the visits of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, specifically the visits of Marko Nikezić to East Germany and of Willy Brant to Yugoslavia. Finally, attention will be paid to Yugoslavia's relations with East and West Germany in the context of the intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia.

“State Funeral of the Hallstein Doctrine” ? : Restoration of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Bonn

In the triangle of the Bonn-Belgrade-East-Berlin relationship, the year of 1968 was also very important. On January 31, after more than ten years, diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia were re-established.¹⁶³ It was the result of a long process. The Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) of the Federal Republic of Germany was formulated during Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship (1949–1963) and doctrinally shaped in 1955 by the so-called Hallstein Doctrine.¹⁶⁴ It was the reason Bonn severed diplomatic relations with Belgrade in Octo-

163 More info on the restoration of relations can be found in: Vladimir Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka 1967-1973. Između ideologije i pragmatizma*, (Beograd: ISI, 2009).

164 More info on the Hallstein Doctrine can be found in: Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973. Aus der Akten der beiden deutschen Außenministerien*, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001); William Glenn Grey, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969*, (Chapel Hill/London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

ber 1957, after Yugoslavia recognized the German Democratic Republic.¹⁶⁵ The foundations of the Eastern Policy of the Christian Democratic Union, which were based on the non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic and the claim to the exclusive representation of the German people, began to shake during the 1960s. The reason was not only that East Germany, although diplomatically isolated, de facto maintained economic, cultural, and even political relations with a growing number of countries, nor that the critics of the Government's Eastern Policy were increasingly vocal in West Germany itself. As time went on, the Western allies showed less and less understanding for Bon's irreconcilable attitude towards Eastern European countries. Therefore, Adenauer's successors tried to align the policy on Eastern Europe with the demands of the allies, without jeopardizing the core of their own foreign and national policy. Thus, already at the beginning of Ludwig Erhard's mandate (1963-1966), trade agreements were concluded with Poland, Romania, and Hungary, and soon after with Bulgaria as well. However, the eastern "offensive" of Ludwig Erhard and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, aimed at rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc countries except for the GDR, was soon stopped by the reaction of East Berlin and Moscow.¹⁶⁶

Although the first steps towards the rapprochement with the East were taken during Erhard's mandate, a fundamental change came with the Social Democrats' entry into government in late 1966. The foreign policy concept of "change through rapprochement" was close to the new West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt as early as in the 1950s, but it was more clearly formulated and verbalized only during the 1960s.¹⁶⁷

165 More info on the recognition of the GDR and severance of relations with FRG can be found in: Marjia Anić de Osona, *Die erste Anerkennung der DDR: Der Bruch der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen 1957*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990); Dušan Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija. Tito između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Demokratske Republike Njemačke*, (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2004); Friederike Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung. Die Jugoslawienpolitik der DDR 1946 bis 1968*, (Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2009).

166 More info on the Erhard's government policy can be found in: Peter Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik. Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag*, (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986), 102-112; Franz Eibl, *Politik der Bewegung. Gerhard Schröder als Außenminister 1961-1966*, (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001).

167 More info on Brandt's Eastern Policy in the 1950s can be found in: Wolfgang Schmidt, "Die Wurzeln der Entspannung: Der konzeptionelle Ursprung der Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik Willy Brandts in den fünfziger Jahren," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2003), 521-563; Gottfried Niedhart, "The East - West Problem as Seen from Berlin: Willy Brandt's Early Ostpolitik", in: *Europe, Cold War and Coexistence 1953-1965*, ed. By Wilfried Loth, (London/Portland: Frank Cass,

In its developed form, the New Eastern Policy was based on the view that détente was a precondition and a path to German unification, which was in contradiction with Adenauer's policy of strength. Brant and those who shared his political views considered the resolving of the German question a long-term process, which could only be achieved if a policy of small steps and peaceful change was adopted. Namely, the "strength" of people, commodities and goods was supposed to gradually influence the internal change of Eastern Europe, and thus East Germany. In this process, the cultural cooperation and economic enhancement of Eastern Europe, which seemed like a contribution to its stabilization, aimed at liberating those countries from economic dependence on Moscow. Through investments and cooperation in the field of economy, it was necessary to boost the self-confidence of Eastern European countries, equalize living standards, and thus prepare Eastern Europe for inclusion in the European Economic Community, and the German Democratic Republic in the Federal Republic of Germany. This policy was based on the view that Germany was not isolated, that its unification depended on a change in the balance of powers in Europe, and that only through contacts and rapprochement such change could be achieved.¹⁶⁸

Diplomatic relations between West Germany and Romania were established in January 1967. Although Bucharest became the first capital after Moscow to host ambassadors of both German states, thus symbolically and de facto accepting the existence of East Germany by Bonn, East Berlin feared that by establishing relations between Bonn and other Eastern European states, East Germany might remain completely diplomatically isolated. Therefore, on the initiative of Moscow and East Berlin, as early as in February 1967, the "reverse Hallstein Doctrine" followed - the so-called "Ulbricht Doctrine". It was in fact an agreement among oth-

2004), 281–292; More info on Brant's stance towards Yugoslavia in the context of the Eastern Policy in the early 1950s can be found in: Natalija Dimić, „Vili Brant, Jugoslavija i jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob: Nastajanje nove istočne politike?“, *Друштвене науке пред изазовима савременог друштва. Тематски зборник радова*, Ниш: Универзитет у Нишу 2017, 189–197.

168 More info on the new Eastern Policy of the Great Coalition, and then of the Willy Brandt's government, can be found in: Wolfgang Schmidt, „Willy Brandts Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik“, in: *Willy Brandts Außenpolitik*, Hrsg. Bernd Rother, (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014), 161–257; Gregor Schöllgen, *Deutsche Außenpolitik von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart*, (München: C. H. Beck, 2013); Gottfried Niedhart, "Ostpolitik: Transformation through Communication and the Quest for Peaceful Change", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3, (2016), 14–59; Dušan Nećak, *Ostpolitik Willija Brandta i Jugoslavija (1963-1966)*, (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2015).

er Warsaw Pact countries not to establish relations with Bonn before West Germany recognizes the existence of East Germany, the borders established after World War II, renounces its claim to nuclear weapons and claim that West Berlin was an integral part of the Federal Republic. Being blocked this way in the realization of its foreign policy conception among the countries of the Eastern Bloc, the West German government turned to Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁹

At first, it seemed that each of the three sides considered the restoration of relations between Belgrade and Bonn as a victory of its own policy. West German diplomacy celebrated another successful step in the realization of the Ostpolitik. East Berlin proclaimed the final fall of the Hallstein Doctrine. The Yugoslav leadership saw the coexistence of two German ambassadors in Belgrade as a proof of the correctness of their policy on the German issue. For neither side, however, was this step devoid of controversy.

At the beginning of 1968, West Germany saw the establishment of diplomatic relations with Belgrade as an example other socialist countries should follow. The New Eastern Policy was conceived as a policy of concessions, striving for peace, overcoming bloc conflicts and, ultimately, German division. Bonn considered East Germany to be the key obstacle to the realization of its policy, which encouraged the negative stance of other Eastern European governments towards the FRG. Therefore, they hoped that the establishment of relations with Yugoslavia would have a positive impact on the stance of other Eastern European countries.¹⁷⁰ This was exactly the outcome that the East German leadership feared. The Yugoslav foreign policy was not bound or controlled by joint decisions and measures of the Warsaw Pact countries, and in the context of the change of leadership in Czechoslovakia, suspicion grew towards any step entailing West Germany's rapprochement with any socialist state.

In Bonn, on the other hand, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia was linked to the fear that a wave of recognition of the German Democratic Republic throughout the Third World would follow. Therefore, from the West German side, the reestablishment of the relations was preceded by the trip of Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger to Southeast Asia. The goal was to ensure that an active Eastern Policy would not

¹⁶⁹ William Glenn Grey, *Op. cit.*, 200–203.

¹⁷⁰ „Dok. 6, Ministerialdirektor Ruete an Botschafter Strätling, Bukarest, 8. Januar 1968“, in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968*, Bd. I, Hrsg. Hans-Peter Schwarz, (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999).

result in the collapse of the Hallstein doctrine.¹⁷¹ On the eve of the start of West German-Yugoslav negotiations on restoring relations in Paris, the FRG's diplomat Otto Lahr warned that the West German side must keep in mind that the GDR would intensify efforts to use the relations between Bonn and Belgrade to affirm its own "policy of partition (of Germany)".¹⁷² A period of uncertainty and intensified diplomatic activity followed, especially in the Arab and Asian capitals.¹⁷³

On the other hand, precisely due to its contacts and influence in the countries of Asia and Africa, Yugoslavia was a very important ally of East Germany in its struggle to break the diplomatic isolation. In the eyes of East Germans, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Belgrade could encourage other countries to recognise the GDR. However, Yugoslavia's example was not supposed to be followed by Eastern European countries, as Bonn hoped, but by non-aligned Third World countries that, due to the Hallstein Doctrine and significant West German development aid, resisted East German efforts to establish official interstate relations. For the reestablishment of relations between the FRG and SFRY to have an international impact, Yugoslavia was to be encouraged to make an official statement on the "bankruptcy" of the Hallstein Doctrine and to help the recognition of the GDR in the Third World through its diplomatic channels. Other Warsaw Pact countries were to respect the February 1967 Agreement and refrain from formal relations with West Germany for the time being, while East Germany was to step up its political activity in Asia and Africa and at the same time offer to West Germany proposals for normalization of relations.¹⁷⁴

As did West German officials in the fall of 1967, East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer set out on an overseas trip in late February 1968. The restoration of relations between Belgrade and Bonn was one of the most important topics of his talks in Southeast Asia and Egypt. At a press conference in Cairo, he underlined that Yugoslavia had not succumbed to Bonn's pressure, that Bonn had certainly been forced to renew diplomatic relations, and that there was no longer any obstacle for other

171 William Glenn Grey, *Op. cit.*, 203–204.

172 *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968*, Bd. I, s. 109, fn 2.

173 Cf. 34, 42, 95, In: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968*, Bd. I.

174 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA), Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (MfAA), C 1423/70, Zur Wiederaufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der SFRJ und Westdeutschland, Berlin, 5.2.1968; PA AA, MfAA, C 422/70, Maßnahmen auf außenpolitischem Gebiet, Februar 1968.

non-aligned countries to recognize the GDR.¹⁷⁵ At the international press conference in New Delhi, he expressed his conviction that the time would soon come when both German states would be equally recognized in the world, of which, his trip to the UAR, Burma and Cambodia, additionally convinced him. In the official daily newspaper of the East German party, these statements were accompanied by headlines such as “Recognition is an inevitable consequence”.¹⁷⁶ On the eve of the Winzer’s trip, the East German Embassy in Belgrade sent a request for Yugoslavia to inform its missions in the countries that Otto Winzer would visit to support the diplomatic affirmation of East Germany.¹⁷⁷

East Germany’s expectations that Yugoslavia would more actively contribute to its diplomatic breakthrough in the non-European world were not unfounded, but they proved to be unjustified. During the previous years, the SFRY was engaged in the international destruction of the Hallstein Doctrine, using its authority among the non-aligned countries. However, after the re-establishment of relations with Bonn, this means of pressure for Yugoslavia lost its efficiency and meaning.

As the Yugoslav ambassador to Congo Brazzaville pointed out in a conversation with his West German counterpart, “every thought of spoiling our relations with West Germany [is] out of place, and let alone through our interference in one or another German state’s relations with third countries, because this was not our practice even in the period of severed relations with West Germany.”¹⁷⁸ Yugoslavia really did not want to spoil relations with West Germany, on the one hand guided by the fact that the normalization of relations would pave the way for lucrative and for the Yugoslav side much-needed economic and financial cooperation, and on the other hand, by the desire to give a chance and support to the social-democratic foreign policy concept.

The instructions of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs to all diplomatic and consular missions clearly show what the Yugoslavs expected from the reestablishment of relations with Bonn, as well as how it should be officially interpreted: the restoration of relations did not re-

175 “Bonner Erpressern Einhalt gebieten?”, *Neues Deutschland*, 25. februar 1968, s. 7.

176 “Anerkennung ist die notwendige Konsequenz”, *Neues Deutschland*, 15. März 1968, s. 6.

177 Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DA MSP RS), Politička arhiva (PA), 1968, f. 116, dos. 12, dok. 46642, Zabeleška o razgovoru zamenika državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Pavićevića sa savetnikom ambasade NDR P. Jakobsom, dana 15. 2. 1968.

178 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 167, dos. 3, do5157, Telegram DSIP-u, Brazavil, 2. 2. 1968.

solve contentious issues, but created a favourable atmosphere for resolving them; it represented a contribution to easing tensions in Europe; Yugoslavia had not set the preconditions for the restoration of relations, but it had not accepted the conditions of the other side either; there had been no change in the Yugoslav policy, the restoration was the result of the consistent application of peaceful coexistence in the interests of peace and security; Yugoslavia's stance towards the German question had not been shaken; the restoration of relations was "de facto a blow to the Hallstein Doctrine and the policy of previous governments", the Hallstein Doctrine was no longer important for Yugoslavia, but "it is up to the FRG government whether it would apply it, to what extent and to whom". The instruction that the establishment of relations should be viewed as a bilateral act that had no connection with third countries essentially meant at least a temporary renunciation of international activities aimed at breaking the Hallstein Doctrine.¹⁷⁹

Diplomats in Eastern European countries were instructed to emphasize that reestablishment of relations with Bonn essentially was a "negation" of the Hallstein Doctrine, and that it did not in any way disrupt Yugoslav cooperation with East Germany and other socialist countries. Nevertheless, this marked a temporary halt of Yugoslav attacks on Bonn, which had previously aided the East German campaigns against West Germany. East German requests for help were met with formal statements. Yugoslav diplomats repeatedly answered that Belgrade had always supported the diplomatic recognition of the GDR. However, in practice, in response to the request of the East German side on the eve of Otto Winzer's trip to Southeast Asia, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs instructed the Yugoslav diplomatic missions there that "no specific steps should be taken regarding this request of the GDR", and that potential questions should simply be answered by "pointing out our well-known views on the German question."¹⁸⁰

On the other hand, to the satisfaction of the East Germans, the Yugoslav side refused to issue a joint statement with West Germany which would include a section on the German people's right to self-determination, despite repeated West German insistence.¹⁸¹ In this regard, the in-

179 DA MSP RS, PA, f. 167, dos. 2, dok. 44445, Telegram DSIP-a svim DK predstavništvima SFRJ u inostranstvu, 2. 2. 1968.

180 DA MSP RS, PA, f. 116, dos. 8, dok. 47153, Telegram DSIP-a Ambasadama SFRJ u Kairu, Delhiju, Rangunu i Pnom Penu, 1. 3. 1968.

181 DA MSP RS, PA, f. 167, dos. 1, dok. 43072, Telegram, Pariz, 23. 1. 1968.

structions were clear - it was necessary to insist that the relations between Belgrade and Bonn should be viewed exclusively as a bilateral issue, which would not impact the general Yugoslav stance towards the German question.¹⁸² Internally, however, the Yugoslavs were convinced that “regardless of whether there will be separate statements and which interpretation will be given by a special statement of the German Government, the very establishment of relations actually means the negation of the Hallstein Doctrine and the affirmation of our foreign policy.”¹⁸³

Even though, no agreement on the joint statement asserting the right to self-determination could be reached, Yugoslavia ceased its international campaigns against the Hallstein Doctrine. Thus, in early March 1968, West German diplomat Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz was able to calmly note that West Germany was generally satisfied with the reaction of the Third World to the establishment of relations with Romania and Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁴

Foreign policy balancing: Nikezić in East Berlin, Brandt in Belgrade

Before the trip to Southeast Asia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, Otto Winzer, had sent a letter to the Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Marko Nikezić.¹⁸⁵ During the presentation of the letter, the GDR Ambassador Eleonora Steimer emphasized the essence of its content - the hope that the restoration of West German-Yugoslav relations would serve as a “state funeral” of the Hallstein Doctrine. She conveyed that Otto Winzer was eager to confidentially discuss how the restoration of relations could be best used internationally. Therefore, Nikezić was invited to East Berlin,¹⁸⁶ which came just a month after the West German side had suggested that Foreign Minister Willy Brandt visit Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁷ It was in this context that the State Secretariat saw the benefits of the

182 DA MSP RS, PA, f. 167, dos. 1, dok. 4714, Predlog naših stavova za razgovore sa SRN o obnavljanju diplomatskih odnosa, 16. 1. 1968.

183 DA MSP RS, PA, f.116, dos. 2, dok. 43213, Telegram DSIP-a Ambasadi SFRJ u Berlinu, 26. 1. 1968.

184 „Dok. 84, Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Duckwitz, 5. 3. 1968“, *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Detuschland 1968*, Bd. I.

185 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Kabinet Predsednika Republike (837), I-5-b/81-5, Pismo Oto Vincera Marku Nikeziću, 20. 2. 1968.

186 AJ, 837, I-5-b/81-5, Zabeleška o razgovoru državnog sekretara Marka Nikezića sa ambasadorom NDR Eleonorom Štajmer, 5.3.1968.

187 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 167, dos. 2, dok. 44610, Zabeleška o poseti Jugoslaviji Willy Brandta, 8. 2. 1968.

meeting between Nikezić and Winzer. "The visit of the GDR Secretary of State is in line with our efforts to further improve relations with the GDR. It suits us, bearing in mind the possible visit of Minister W. Brandt to Yugoslavia, because at the same time our relationship with the two German states will be balanced and it will reaffirm the independent position of Yugoslavia on the German question", as it was underlined in the note on Nikezić's trip to the GDR.¹⁸⁸

Whereas Brandt's visit was expected to yield concrete results,¹⁸⁹ Nikezić's journey to the GDR was mostly symbolic. It occurred at a time when mutual relations, at least seemingly, were at their peak, but also when ideological differences began to crystallize again, primarily with regard to the developments in Czechoslovakia. However, despite ideological disagreements, Belgrade considered itself too important for the GDR to risk worsening relations.

expected the East Germans to make efforts not to worsen relations with Yugoslavia, due to the benefits they could reap in terms of the international position of the GDR.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, "In the name of good friendship between the GDR and SFRY" was the headline in *Neues Deutschland* in April 1968 on the eve of Marko Nikezić's visit. The author of the article underlined Yugoslavia's resolute rejection of the Hallstein Doctrine, recalling Tito's earlier statement that it was fortunate that East Germany existed as a factor of peace in Europe.¹⁹¹

"This visit has a special, political significance," Otto Winzer pointed out at the beginning of the conversation with Marko Nikezić on April 23, 1968. "I underline that the visit itself has such a significance, because of the SFRY's stance on the two German states."¹⁹² In a similar way, Walter Ulbricht emphasized that the restoration of relations between Bonn and Belgrade was "an example of how to maintain relations with both German

188 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118. dos. 14, dok. 410585, Podsetnik u vezi sa posetom državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove Marka Nikezića Nemačkoj Demokratskoj Republici od 22. do 26. aprila 1968, 17. 4. 1968.

189 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 167, dos. 2, dok. 44610, Zabeleška o poseti Jugoslaviji Willy Brandta, 8. 2. 1968.

190 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118. dos. 14, dok. 410585, Podsetnik u vezi sa posetom državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove Marka Nikezića Nemačkoj Demokratskoj Republici od 22. do 26. aprila 1968, 17. 4. 1968.

191 "Im Zeichen guter Freundschaft DDR-SFRJ", *Neues Deutschland*, 23. april 1968, s. 7.

192 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118, dos. 14, dok. 410585/28, Zapisnik o razgovorima državnog sekretara Marka Nikezića i ministra inostranih poslova NDR Ota Vincera u Berlinu 23. i 24. aprila 1968. godine, 15. 5. 1968.

states.”¹⁹³ During Nikezić’s visit, East Germans again asked for mediation in the Third World, for support in the UN and in specialized international agencies.¹⁹⁴ In this context, Nikezić pointed out that “we have neither such influence nor such possibilities to exert pressure”, but that after the restoration of relations with Bonn, the Yugoslav stance on the German question gained weight and may seem more convincing.¹⁹⁵ In other words, the Yugoslav side agreed to be an example to others, but did not commit to active support for the international affirmation of East Germany.

In addition, Nikezić underlined that in order to improve relations in Europe, it was necessary for the West Germans to give up on the position that unification would take place under their terms and conditions. In this context, he explained: “We resist that line as part of a global imperialist policy.” Citing Italy as an example, he stressed that in Western countries there were contradictions between US pressure and the readiness of certain “democratic” and “left” forces for cooperation with Yugoslavia.¹⁹⁶ In other words, Yugoslav diplomacy did not view Western countries as monolithic, but, as in previous years, saw them as mazes of various “currents”, mostly divided into proponents of “global imperialist” policies on the one hand and “democratic” on the other. Such a Yugoslav perspective was increasingly seen with apprehension and suspicion in East Berlin. Although the restoration of relations between Bonn and Belgrade was largely welcomed, the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered West German rapprochement with Yugoslavia to be an integral part of Bonn’s new Eastern policy, which aimed to divide the socialist world and in particular to isolate the Soviet Union and East Germany.¹⁹⁷ It was “clear” to East Berlin that the new Eastern policy was nothing but an integral part of the US global strategy, while in their opinion Yugosla-

193 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118, dos. 14, dok. 410585, Izlaganje Predsednika Državnog saveta NDR Valtera Ulbrihta u toku razgovora sa državnim sekretarom Markom Nikezićem 23. 4. 1968, 13. 5. 1968.

194 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118, dos. 14, dok. 410585/28, Zapisnik o razgovorima državnog sekretara Marka Nikezića i ministra inostranih poslova NDR Ota Vincera u Berlinu 23. i 24. aprila 1968. godine, 15. 5. 1968.

195 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118, dos. 14, dok. 410585/28, Zapisnik o razgovorima državnog sekretara Marka Nikezića i ministra inostranih poslova NDR Ota Vincera u Berlinu 23. i 24. aprila 1968. godine, 15. 5. 1968.

196 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118, dos. 14, dok. 410585/28, Zapisnik o razgovorima državnog sekretara Marka Nikezića i ministra inostranih poslova NDR Ota Vincera u Berlinu 23. i 24. aprila 1968. godine, 15. 5. 1968.

197 PA AA, MfAA, C 1423/70, Entwicklung der Beziehungen SFRJ-Westdeutschland nach Wiederaufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen (Einschätzung), Berlin, 17. 4. 1968.

via overestimated the importance of the process of reducing tensions in Europe. Yugoslavia was wrong to see the “grand coalition”¹⁹⁸ as a step in the right direction, and it harboured illusions about the Social Democratic Party’s Eastern European policy.¹⁹⁹

However, public attacks on Yugoslavia were missing. Instructions of the East German Foreign Ministry to its Embassy in Yugoslavia on Brandt’s upcoming visit were a clear example. The East Germans should emphasize good relations with Yugoslavia, while underlining that relationship between Bonn and Belgrade was far from ideal.²⁰⁰ Internally, however, the East Berlin Ministry concluded that Brandt’s “demagoguery” found fertile ground in Yugoslavia, which had previously refrained from any public condemnation of the Bonn policy and its attacks on the GDR in order to make economic gains.²⁰¹

The East German leadership was convinced that “West German imperialism” had been able to use the official channels for “political and ideological diversion” in Yugoslavia since the re-establishment of their relations.²⁰² Although there were no public attacks, warnings about the “true nature” of Brandt’s New Eastern Policy were communicated to the Yugoslav side. At the end of June, after Brandt’s visit, the Yugoslav side received a statement from the GDR State Council underlining that Brandt was only camouflaging the expansionist plans of the West German imperialists with “ornate words”, and that the “Kiesinger-Strauss Government”, in cooperation with Brandt, advocated “only a slightly repainted version of the old failed revanchist policy”. Pressure Bonn was still putting on the Third World countries not to recognise the GDR was underlined as a clear proof that no change occurred in West German foreign policy. In their view, if Bonn genuinely wanted to normalize relations with Eastern

198 Grand coalition (*Große Koalition*) means a governing coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD, as two major political parties in (West) Germany. Here it refers to the first grand coalition which was formed in 1966 and lasted until 1969. The chancellor was Kurt Georg Kiesinger from the CDU, and the Foreign Minister the SPD chairman Willy Brandt.

199 *Ibid.*

200 PA AA, MfAA, C 1423/70, Maßnahmen in Verbindung mit dem Brandtbesuch in Jugoslawien (13-15. Juni 1968), Berlin, 14.5.1968.

201 More info on the assessments of Brandt’s visit to Yugoslavia can be found in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1423/70

202 PA AA, MfAA, C 1423/70, Entwicklung der Beziehungen SFRJ-Westdeutschland nach Wiederaufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen (Einschätzung), Berlin, 17. 4. 1968.

Europe, it would first influence the West to recognize the German Democratic Republic.²⁰³

On the other hand, Belgrade saw “progress” in Bonn’s policy since the Social Democrats joined the government. Although there were no significant changes in West German stance towards the German question, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs considered that the grand coalition still tried to pursue a more independent policy towards the USA, and that it approached the cooperation with Eastern European countries “with more realism and flexibility”.²⁰⁴ Unlike the East Germans, who interpreted the New Eastern policy as nothing more but a part of the “US global strategy”, the Yugoslavs saw in it the beginnings of a more independent European policy of the West German Social Democrats. While the East Germans tried to convince their Yugoslav interlocutors that Willy Brandt’s goal was “social democratization” of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavs, also sensitive to condemnations for “social democratism”, saw in him an “affirmed anti-fascist”, a man of a significantly different profile than Adenauer and his closest associates who had governed West German for almost two decades.²⁰⁵

The Yugoslavs were therefore ready for a change of policy towards Bonn. The anti-German campaigns were now avoided in public, as was setting conditions or time ultimatums for the West German government.²⁰⁶ On the one hand, Willy Brandt’s visit to Yugoslavia was aimed at discussing contentious bilateral issues. These included issues of reparations, compensation, political émigrés, guestworkers, and economic and trade cooperation – each of them being highly important for Yugoslavia.²⁰⁷ The visit itself was not expected to bring concrete solutions, but to show Brandt’s readiness to really work towards improving bilateral relations.

203 AJ, 837, I-5-b/81-5, Izjava Državnog Saveta NDR, 21. jun 1968. (uručena 27. juna 1968)

204 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 172, dos. 11, dok. 418385, Informacija o poseti Jugoslaviji vice-kancelara i ministra spoljnih poslova SR Nemačke Willy Brandta, od 12. do 14. VI 1968, 29. 5. 1968; DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 172, dos. 11, dok. 418263, Predlog da drug Predsednik primi Willy Brandta, ministra spoljnih poslova SRN, 22. 5. 1968.

205 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 172, dos. 11, dok. 418263, Predlog da drug Predsednik primi Willy Brandta, ministra spoljnih poslova SRN, 22. 5. 1968; DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118, dos. 14, dok. 410585/28, Zapisnik o razgovorima državnog sekretara Marka Nikezića i ministra inostranih poslova NDR Ota Vincera u Berlinu 23. i 24. aprila 1968. godine, 15. 5. 1968.

206 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 172, dos. 11, dok. 418385, Informacija o poseti Jugoslaviji vice-kancelara i ministra spoljnih poslova SR Nemačke Willy Brandta, od 12. do 14. VI 1968, 29. 5. 1968.

207 Ibid.

The fact that, after the official three-day visit, Willy Brandt and his wife stayed privately in Yugoslavia as personal guests of Marko Nikezić and his wife in Dubrovnik testified to how important it was for both sides to build mutual trust.²⁰⁸ It was a level of closeness never achieved with East German officials.

On the other hand, the significance of Brandt's visit did not resort to solving bilateral issues. The very re-establishment of diplomatic relations without preconditions was essentially an expression of support for the New Eastern policy. The Social were expected to pursue a different European policy than their predecessors. In light of that, the Yugoslavs hoped that Willy Brandt's visit would help them support the West German Government "in those positions that we would appreciate to be more flexible and positive" through an exchange of views on key international issues.²⁰⁹ It represented an integral part of the Yugoslav European policy in the context of its "return to Europe".²¹⁰

Czechoslovakia

At the beginning of 1968, relations between Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic seemed to be at their peak. During the previous years, there were mutual official visits of Josip Broz Tito and Walter Ulbricht, as well as meetings and consultations of the foreign ministers of the two countries, Marko Nikezić and Otto Winzer, in April 1966, May 1967 and December of the same year.²¹¹ East Germany proclaimed the collapse of the Hallstein Doctrine following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Belgrade. At the same time, however, in January 1968, a change of leadership occurred in Czechoslovakia. The arrival of Alexander Dubček at the head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia began to arouse hopes and fears, gradually disturbing the European balance. East German distrust of Bonn was constant, but in 1968 it intensified due to the developments in neighbouring Czechoslo-

208 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 172, dos. 11, dok. 419513, Telegram DSIP-u, Bon, 27. 5. 1968.

209 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 172, dos. 12, dok. 422624, Telegram DSIP-a svim DK predstavništvima SFRJ, 19. 6. 1968.

210 Љубодраг Димић, „Повратак у Европу: Југославија и питање европске безбедности крајем 60-их и почетком 70-их година XX века“, *Глас САНУ*, Том 428, књ. 18, 2018, 63–95.

211 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 118, dos. 14, dok. 410585, Podsetnik u vezi sa posetom državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove Marka Nikezića Nemačkoj Demokratskoj Republici od 22. do 26. aprila 1968, 17. 4. 1968.

vakia. In the Manichaeian worldview of East Berlin, divided into imperialism and socialism, the “imperialist enemy” sought to use the situation in Prague against the party there, against the socialist community and ultimately against the German Democratic Republic. The enemy was the “global strategy” of the United States and its European incarnation in the form of the New Eastern policy. On the other hand, West Germany hoped that the changes in Prague could open some room for cooperation in another Eastern European capital.²¹² East German concerns about developments in Czechoslovakia were at least twofold. On the one hand, they feared ideological influences that could spill over the border, and on the other, the potential foreign policy turn of the Prague leadership, which until then had been one of the strongest pillars of East German policy, in the direction of rapprochement with West Germany. Although the restoration of relations between Belgrade and Bonn was a sign of collapse of the Hallstein Doctrine, there were similar twofold fears in relation to Yugoslavia - fear of Yugoslav-West German rapprochement and, “traditionally”, of Yugoslavia’s “independent path to socialism”.

Since January, Yugoslav diplomats have registered an exceptional interest of both East and West Germans in the events in neighbouring Czechoslovakia.²¹³ They believed that in East Germany, due to fears of Czechoslovakia’s development, there were increasing tendencies of “stagnation and alienation from the course of democratization”, that “conservative forces” were strengthening, and that this was a “step back” from the

212 Negotiations on opening the commercial mission were led as early as in 1967, and in 1968, until the Warsaw Pact’s intervention in Czechoslovakia, informal contacts between the social democratic leadership and the Czech representatives were maintained. See: Wolfgang Schmidt, „Willy Brandts Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik“, 194–195. After the establishment of relations with the FRG, the Yugoslavia’s representatives also pinned West Germany’s hopes that the shift in the leadership in Prague could open the window for further development of relations with Eastern Europe. In his talks with Loeck, the advisor at the Embassy of the FRG to Belgrade, R. Uvalić underlined that reduction of tensions in the communist world could create a favourable environment for cooperation with West Germany, and that Yugoslavia tried to provide a positive example, through its own actions, for other socialist countries. See: „Dok. 124: Botschaftsrat Loeck, Belgrad, an das Auswärtige Amt, 9. April 1968“, *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968*, Bd. I, pp. 448–9.

213 See the following reports, for instance: DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 116, dos. 8, dok. 4407, Telegram DSIP-u, Berlin, 31. 1. 1968; DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 115, dos. 1, dok. 49886, Telegram DSIP-u, Berlin, 12. 3. 1968; DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 116, dos. 8, dok. 411145, Telegram DSIP-u, Berlin, 21. 3. 1968; DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 165, dos. 2, dok. 415981, Generalni konzulat SFRJ u Hamburgu DSIP-u, Komentar štampe o događajima u ČSSR – informacija, 12. 4. 1968.

policy pursued in previous years.²¹⁴ As in the West, Yugoslav diplomacy recognized different “currents” within Eastern European countries and parties. Thus, in East Germany during 1968, they distinguished the opposed “progressive” and “bureaucratic” forces. The “progressive tendencies” were especially noticeable during 1967, whereas during 1968, under the influence of Czechoslovak development, and with the support of the Soviet Union, “bureaucratic” state and party structures became increasingly prominent.²¹⁵

In contrast to the upswing in mutual relations which lasted until the end of 1967,²¹⁶ in the spring of 1968 the Yugoslavs noticed that “conservative forces” were prevailing with regard to the East German stance on Yugoslavia.²¹⁷ However, while towards the Yugoslavs the East German leadership showed restraint, it was ready to apply all “necessary” measures in order to discipline other socialist countries’ stance on the German question. Otto Winzer criticised Czechoslovak rapprochement with West Germany with the following words - “there is West Germany, but no Western Hungary, Western Bulgaria or Western Czechoslovakia”. In other words, intensified contacts between Prague and Bonn were deemed a direct interference in the internal affairs of the German people.²¹⁸ As early as in March 1968, the GDR leadership characterized the events in Czechoslovakia as a counter-revolution. Ulbricht was convinced that the organizers of this “counter-revolution” were sitting in Washington and Bonn, and that “Prague revisionism” was actually directed against the German Democratic Republic.²¹⁹ For the East German leadership, support to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was not just a matter of solidarity or obedience to the Soviet Union - it was a matter of protecting their own security, and a reaction to the feeling of being trapped between Bonn’s Eastern policy and Prague’s ideological “revisionism”. The Yugoslav

214 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 116, dos. 8, dok. 413739, Telegram DSIP-u, Berlin, 11. 4. 1968.

215 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 116, dos. 6, dok. 42062, Neki momenti unutrašnjih kretanja u NDR-u, 29. 4. 1968.

216 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 116, dos. 6, dok. 42062, Neki momenti unutrašnjih kretanja u NDR-u, 29. 4. 1968.

217 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 116, dos. 8, dok. 413739, Telegram DSIP-u, Berlin, 11. 4. 1968.

218 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (BArch), Stiftung Parteien und Massenorganisationen (SAPMO), DY 30/3616, Vermerk über eine Unterredung des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Genossen Winzer, mit dem Botschafter der CSSR in der DDR, Genossen V. Kolár, 1. april 1968.

219 Manfred Wilke, “Ulbricht, East Germany and the Prague Spring”, in: *The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia*, eds. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, Peter Ruggenthaler, (Lexington Books, 2007), 341–370.

side also concluded that Ulbricht was among the most active advocates of intervention in Czechoslovakia, the doctrine of limited sovereignty and the thesis of a single path to socialism precisely because, for the GDR, the stance of socialist countries towards the German question was “vital”.²²⁰

However, Yugoslav stance towards the West Germans was not without reservations. During the spring of 1968, Yugoslav diplomats concluded that West German media coverage of events in Czechoslovakia was moderate, fairly objective, and rational. While not being used for anti-communist propaganda, efforts to criticize the Polish, East German and Soviet leaderships on the example of Czechoslovakia were evident. The Yugoslavs therefore considered the West German stance on the developments in Czechoslovakia to be in the service of separating the Eastern European countries from Moscow.²²¹ Although disapproving of the Warsaw Pact’s “tightening of the noose” around Czechoslovakia, they tried until the end of August 1968 not to give the West Germans a reason to speculate about possible disagreements between Belgrade and the Eastern Bloc. Thus, in a conversation with Willy Brandt in June 1968, Tito only briefly answered Brandt’s question about the Soviet position on Czechoslovakia, by saying that Moscow certainly did not want to increase tensions in Europe, quickly changing the topic of conversation.²²²

Such restraint before Western officials regarding the position on the developments in Czechoslovakia lasted until late August 1968 and the intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries. At an extraordinary meeting convened on the evening of August 21 in Brioni, Tito rejected the official Soviet interpretation according to which western and in particular West German threat to Czechoslovakia posed a legitimate reason for the intervention. “It’s not just about Czechoslovakia, but in fact about us,” Tito pointed out.²²³ On the one hand, the Yugoslavs believed that they were on the path of Soviet “penetration” towards the Middle East, and that Yugoslavia’s geographical position was important for Soviet geostrategic inter-

220 AJ, 837, I-5-b/81-5, Informacija o ulozi JSPN u zaošttravanju odnosa među komunističkim partijama i socijalističkim zemljama, 13.1.1969.

221 DAMSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 165, dos. 2, dok. 415981, Generalni konzulat SFRJ u Hamburgu DSIP-u, Komentar štampe o događajima u ČSSR – informacija, 12. 4. 1968.

222 AJ, 837, I-3-a/83-19, Razgovor Predsednika Republike sa Vilijem Brantom, 15. 6. 1968.

223 Hrvoje Klasić, *Op. cit.*, 408–409; Љубодраг Димић, „Година 1968 – исходиште нове југословенске спољнополитичке оријентације“, у: *1968 – четрдесет година после*, 343–351.

ests.²²⁴ On the other hand, they believed that the intervention was internally and ideologically motivated. In their view, Moscow feared that the proces of “democratization” of Czechoslovakia would lead to its independence from the USSR, as was the case with Yugoslavia two decades earlier.²²⁵

Yugoslavia’s criticism of the intervention changed East Berlin’s attitude towards Belgrade. “The Germans have become noticeably cold,” Yugoslav diplomats to the East German capital noted as early as in late August 1968. However, they still believed that Yugoslavia was a too important foreign political ally for East Germany for its leadership to take a course of drastic deterioration of relations.²²⁶ Nevertheless, contrary to Yugoslav estimates, the East German Embassy in Belgrade and the GDR Foreign Ministry agreed that Yugoslavia, based on its “revisionist”, “nationalist” and “anti-Soviet” positions, sided with “anti-socialist” forces in Czechoslovakia, which made it “one of the imperialist states”.²²⁷ Representatives of the East German Embassy in Belgrade warned that the Yugoslav leadership and media not only denied the “counter-revolutionary danger” in Czechoslovakia, but also underestimated the dangerous nature of “the US global strategy” and of “Bonn’s New Eastern policy”.²²⁸ The GDR’s Foreign Ministry was even harsher, criticizing the Embassy’s representatives for not recognizing the efforts of “West German imperialism” to use the developments in Czechoslovakia to strengthen its position in Yugoslavia.²²⁹ The East German diplomats were tasked with fighting “the growing imperialism in Yugoslavia”, as well as Yugoslavia’s influence in the Third World.²³⁰ It soon became clear to the Yugoslavs that the impor-

224 Драган Богетић, „Поруке и поуке војне интервенције у Чехословачкој 1968. године“, у: *Право на побуну: '68. код нас и у свету*, 50–54.

225 Hrvoje Klasić, *Op. cit.*, 408–409; Љубодраг Димић, „Година 1968 ...“, 343–351.

226 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 116, dos. 8, dok. 428286, Telegram DSIP-u, Berlin, 31. 8. 1968.

227 PA AA, MfAA, C 1171/72, Einschätzung der Haltung der Partei- und Staatsführung der SFRJ zur Lage und zu den Ereignissen in der und um die Tschechoslowakische Sozialistische Republik, Belgrad, 16. 9. 1968; PA AA, MfAA, C 1171/72, Stellungnahme des MfAA und der Abt. Internationale Verbindungen zum Bericht der Botschaft der DDR in Belgrad über die Einschätzung der Haltung der Partei- und Staatsführung Jugoslawiens zur Lage und zu den Ereignissen in der CSSR, 20. 9. 1968.

228 PA AA, MfAA, C 1171/72, Einschätzung der Haltung der Partei- und Staatsführung der SFRJ zur Lage und zu den Ereignissen in der und um die Tschechoslowakische Sozialistische Republik, Belgrad, 16. 9. 1968.

229 PA AA, MfAA, C 1171/72, Stellungnahme des MfAA und der Abt. Internationale Verbindungen zum Bericht der Botschaft der DDR in Belgrad über die Einschätzung der Haltung der Partei- und Staatsführung Jugoslawiens zur Lage und zu den Ereignissen in der CSSR, 20. 9. 1968.

230 Ibid.

tance they ascribed to themselves would not prevent anti-Yugoslav actions in the GDR, even by the highest party and state figures, including Ulbricht. These attacks were perceived as slanders, incorrect interpretations of Yugoslav policy, attempts to equate it with the imperialist one, which was a direct insult that could not remain without consequences for bilateral relations.²³¹

The intervention in Czechoslovakia did not remain without consequences for the Eastern policy of Bonn, and in connection with that, for the West German-Yugoslav relations as well. In essence, it assured West German diplomacy and, above all, the Social Democratic leadership that an active Eastern policy could not pass *by*, but *through* Moscow, and that it was necessary to accept the status quo in Europe in order to change it. It was primarily a matter of accepting the existence of the German Democratic Republic - a policy that could not be implemented by the coalition government headed by the Christian Democrats.²³² Although the tanks on the streets of Prague and Bratislava temporarily suspended the rapprochement between Bonn and Eastern European countries, they, at the same time, accelerated the pace of Yugoslav-West German cooperation. This was affected by several factors. On the one hand, Bonn's political and strategic interests went in that direction. In order to at least partially achieve the goals of the new Eastern policy, after the cooperation with other Eastern European countries was shut down, Yugoslavia became even more important. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's interest in intensifying cooperation with West Germany was significantly influenced by its economic needs.²³³ As Marko Nikezić pointed out in October 1968 during the meeting with Willy Brandt in New York, the negotiations on loans that were conducted between the two countries were of great political, not only economic significance.²³⁴ The Yugoslav side, in other words, tried to use

231 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 116, dos. 10, dok. 441477, Beleška o napadima najviših rukovodilaca NDR na Jugoslaviju na plenumu CK JSPN i na akademiji povodom oktobarske revolucije, kao i u drugim prilikama, 21. 11. 1968.

232 Wolfgang Schmidt, „Willy Brandts Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik“, 195–197.

More info on negotiations of Brandt's Government with Moscow can be found in: Julia von Dannenberg, *The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

233 More info on economic and financial needs as some of the key motives of the Yugoslav side to get closer with the FRG can be found in: Зоран Јањетовић, „Полуслужбено партнерство – Југославија и Савезна Република Немачка шездесетих година XX века“, у: *1968 – четрдесет година после. Зборник радова*, 259–273.

234 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 167, dos. 5, dok. 437070, Telegram DSIP-u, Njujork, 12. 10. 1968.

the readiness of the West Germans to provide Yugoslavia with economic assistance for the sake of their own political interests in the moments of tensions between Belgrade and Moscow.

However, the Yugoslav-West German rapprochement in the late 1960s was also influenced by the ideological closeness and complementary mutual expectations of the Yugoslav Communists and the West German Social Democrats. On the one hand, since the early 1950s, Yugoslavia considered the representatives of the SPD to be "internal democratic forces" that could lead West Germany in a "progressive" direction.²³⁵ When the SPD entered the West German Government in 1966, the Yugoslav side expected it to carry out a "more rational" and "peaceful" foreign policy. On the other hand, Willy Brandt saw the Yugoslav development since the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Cominform as a potential example for other communist parties and Eastern European countries, i.e. as a role model for their detachment from Moscow.²³⁶ Thus, in October 1968, in a conversation with Nikezić, he praised the increasing autonomy of the west european communist parties from Moscow following the intervention in Czechoslovakia. He believed this process would significantly affect the political situation and the balance of powers in Europe and that European countries should act independently to deescalate tensions in Europe.²³⁷ Moreover, as he said through his friend and confidant Leo Bauer, who visited Yugoslavia at the end of 1968, the SPD and League of Communists of Yugoslavia were of great importance for positive developments on the left, the former as an example for Western and the latter for Eastern socialist countries.²³⁸ It was a depiction of Europe and European cooperation not that different from the vision nurtured by the Yugoslav communists since the 1950s.

235 More info on the Yugoslavia's view of the West German Social Democrats in the early 1950s can be found in the paper from this Collection: Natalija Dimić Lompar, „Yugoslavia's Stance towards the German Question during the Late 1940s and Early 1950s: From Bloc Allegiance to Non-Alignment“.

236 Natalija Dimić, "Vili Brant, Jugoslavija i jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob: Nastajanje nove istočne politike?".

237 DA MSP RS, PA, 1968, f. 167, dos. 5, dok. 437070, Telegram DSIP-u, Njujork, 12. 10. 1968.

238 DA MSP RS, PA 1968, f. 167, dos. 10, dok. 446866, Zabeleška o razgovoru Bore Mirkovića, sekretara Komisije za međunarodnu saradnju i veze SK SSRNJ i Dušana Litvinovića, saradnika u Komisiji, sa Leo Bauerom, urednikom teoretskog časopisa Socijaldemokratske partije Nemačke „Novo društvo“ 24. 12. 1968.

Conclusion

At the beginning of 1968, relations between Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic seemed to be at their peak. At the same time, in January 1968, after more than ten years, diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany were restored. In public, the East Germans interpreted this step as a “state funeral of the Hallstein Doctrine”, while the West Germans proclaimed another successful step in the implementation of the New Eastern policy. While in Bonn they hoped that Yugoslavia would become an example for other Eastern European countries, in East Berlin they feared that the West German government’s Eastern policy would lead to the isolation of East Germany even within the Eastern Bloc. On the other hand, the East Germans hoped that by restoring relations between Belgrade and Bonn, Yugoslavia would become an example for other Third World countries that were reluctant to establish relations with East Germany. Such a “chain reaction” in the Third World was the scenario that the government in Bonn feared. Each German state strived to encourage Yugoslav officials to support its policy on the German question.

The Yugoslav side thought that the restoration of diplomatic relations with West Germany had de facto annulled the Hallstein Doctrine. This position was expressed in talks with East German and East European representatives. However, unlike in previous years and contrary to the East German expectations, in 1968 the Yugoslavs did not attempt to overthrow the Hallstein Doctrine among non-European countries. On the contrary, according to the instructions of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the restoration of relations was to be viewed as a bilateral act, and the application of the Hallstein Doctrine to other countries as an internal West German issue. On the other hand, the Yugoslav side refused to include in the joint statement on the restoration of diplomatic relations with Bonn a paragraph on the right of the German people to self-determination, despite repeated West German insistence. A balanced relationship with the two German states was the goal of Yugoslav policy until the late summer of 1968. Marko Nikezić’s trip to East Berlin in April 1968 was therefore welcome as a counterweight to Brandt’s upcoming visit to Yugoslavia, as a good opportunity to balance Yugoslav relations with East and West Germany, as well as to emphasize the Yugoslav independent stance on the German question.

The restrained public stance on the Hallstein Doctrine was partly motivated by the need for regulating bilateral issues with Bonn. How-

ever, in 1968, the ideological dimension of Belgrade's relations with the two German states gained in importance. The reasons were twofold. On one hand, under the influence of the developments in Czechoslovakia, ideological differences between the Yugoslav and East German parties began to crystallize again. The Yugoslav leadership recognized the strengthening of "dogmatic" and "bureaucratic" forces in the East German party, which was interpreted as a "step backwards" in relation to the intra-party development over past years. The East Germans, on the other hand, internally resented the Yugoslav path to socialism (which they believed to have an encouraging effect on the Prague leadership), as well as the Yugoslav-West German rapprochement. They believed that the Yugoslavs underestimated the "danger" of the new Eastern policy, not recognizing it as a part of the "global strategy" of the United States, and that Brandt's "demagoguery" found fertile ground in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslavs saw the entry of the Social Democrats into the West German Government as a positive step. Ever since the early 1950s, they considered them to be "internal democratic forces" that could lead West Germany in a "progressive" direction. They believed that the new government, unlike the previous ones, was pursuing a more independent European policy. The head of West German diplomacy, Willy Brandt, was seen as an "affirmed anti-fascist", completely different than Adenauer and his associates. All this assured the Yugoslav side that the West German Social Democrats should be supported, and that their efforts to pursue a more active Eastern policy should not be undermined. This stance was strengthened during the bilateral meetings in 1968. Brandt's views on European cooperation independent of Moscow and Washington were close to the Yugoslav stance. Although not long after the intervention in Czechoslovakia Yugoslav relations with the East improved, in ideological terms, from the Yugoslav perspective, the East German leadership remained the embodiment of "dogmatic" and "bureaucratic" structures, while the West German Social Democrats were considered the "force" that might lead a unified Germany in a "progressive" direction.

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